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Abstract
The present paper provides an analysis of the existing proof systems for
dynamic epistemic logic from the viewpoint of proof-theoretic semantics.
Dynamic epistemic logic is one of the best known members of a family of
logical systems which have been successfully applied to diverse scientific
disciplines, but the proof theoretic treatment of which presents many dif-
ficulties. After an illustration of the proof-theoretic semantic principles
most relevant to the treatment of logical connectives, we turn to illus-
trating the main features of display calculi, a proof-theoretic paradigm
which has been successfully employed to give a proof-theoretic semantic
account of modal and substructural logics. Then, we review some of the
most significant proposals of proof systems for dynamic epistemic logics,
and we critically reflect on them in the light of the previously introduced
proof-theoretic semantic principles. The contributions of the present pa-
per include a generalisation of Belnap’s cut elimination metatheorem for
display calculi, and a revised version of the display-style calculus D.EAK
[30]. We verify that the revised version satisfies the previously mentioned
proof-theoretic semantic principles, and show that it enjoys cut elimina-
tion as a consequence of the generalised metatheorem.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, driven by applications in areas spanning from program semantics
to game theory, the logical formalisms pertaining to the family of dynamic logics
[31, 48] have been very intensely investigated, giving rise to a proliferation of
variants.
Typically, the language of a given dynamic logic is an expansion of classical
propositional logic with an array of modal-type dynamic operators, each of which
takes an action as a parameter. The set of actions plays in some cases the role
of a set of indexes or parameters; in other cases, actions form a quantale-type
algebra. When interpreted in relational models, the formulas of a dynamic logic
express properties of the model encoding the present state of affairs, as well as
the pre- and post-conditions of a given action. Actions formalize transformations
of one model into another one, the updated model, which encodes the state of
affairs after the action has taken place.
Dynamic logics have been investigated mostly w.r.t. their semantics and
complexity, while their proof-theoretic aspects have been comparatively not
so prominent. However, the existing proposals of proof systems for dynamic
logics witness a varied enough array of methodologies, that a methodological
evaluation is now timely.
The present paper is aimed at evaluating the current proposals of proof-
systems for the best-known dynamic epistemic logics from the viewpoint of
proof-theoretic semantics.
Proof-theoretic semantics [47] is a theory of meaning which assigns formal
proofs or derivations an autonomous semantic content. That is, formal proofs
are treated as entities in terms of which meaning can be accounted for. Proof-
theoretic semantics has been very influential in an area of research in structural
proof theory which aims at defining the meaning of logical connectives in terms
of an analysis of the behaviour of the logical connectives inside the derivations
of a given proof system. Such an analysis is possible only in the context of
proof systems which perform well w.r.t. certain criteria; hence, one of the main
themes in this area is to identify design criteria which both guarantee that
the proof system enjoys certain desirable properties such as normalization or
cut-elimination, and which make it possible to speak about the proof-theoretic
meaning for given logical connectives.
An analysis of dynamic logics from a proof-theoretic semantic viewpoint is
beneficial both for dynamic logics and for structural proof theory. Indeed, such
an analysis provides dynamic logics with sound methodological and foundational
principles, and with an entirely novel perspective on the topic of dynamics and
change, which is independent from the dominating model-theoretic methods.
Moreover, such an analysis provides structural proof theory with a novel ar-
ray of case studies against which to test the generality of its proof-theoretic
semantic principles, and with the opportunity to extend its modus operandi to
still uncharted settings, such as the multi-type calculi introduced in [23].
The structure of the paper goes as follows: in section 2, we introduce the basic
ideas of proof-theoretic semantics, as well as some of the principles in struc-
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tural proof theory that were inspired by it, and we explain their consequences
and spirit, in view of their applications in the following sections. In section 3,
we prove a generalisation of Belnap’s cut elimination metatheorem. In section
4, we review some of the most significant proposals of proof systems for dy-
namic epistemic logics, focusing mainly on the logic of Public Announcements
(PAL) [44] and the logic of Epistemic Knowledge and Actions (EAK) [12], and
we critically reflect on them in the light of the principles of proof-theoretic se-
mantics stated in section 2; in particular, in subsection 4.4, we focus on the
display-type calculus D.EAK for PAL/EAK introduced in [30]: we highlight its
critical issues—the main of which being that a smooth (Belnap-style) proof of
cut-elimination is not readily available for it. In section 5, we expand on the
final coalgebra semantics for D.EAK, which will be relevant for the following
developments. In section 6, we propose a revised version of D.EAK, discuss
why the revision is more adequate for proof-theoretic semantics, and finally
prove the cut-elimination theorem for the revised version as a consequence of
the metatheorem proven in section 3. In section 7, we collect some conclusions
and indicate further directions. Most of the proofs and derivations are collected
in appendices A, B and C.
2 Preliminaries on proof-theoretic semantics and
Display Calculi
In the present section, we review and discuss the proof-theoretic notions which
will be used in the further development of the paper. In the following subsection,
we outline the conceptual foundations of proof-theoretic semantics; in subsection
2.2, Belnap-style display calculi will be discussed; in subsection 2.3 a refinement
of Belnap’s analysis, due to Wansing, will be reported on. Our presentation is
certainly not exhaustive, and will limit itself to targeting the issues needed in
the further development of the paper. The reader is referred to [47, 46] for a
detailed presentation of proof-theoretic semantics, and to [49, 50] for a discussion
of proof-theoretic semantic principles in structural proof theory.
2.1 Basic ideas in proof-theoretic semantics
Proof-theoretic semantics is a line of research which covers both philosophical
and technical aspects, and is concerned with methodological issues. Proof-
theoretic semantics is based on the idea that a purely inferential theory of
meaning is possible. That is, that the meaning of expressions (in a formal
language or in natural language) can be captured purely in terms of the proofs
and the inference rules which participate in the generation of the given expres-
sion, or in which the given expression participates. This inferential view is
opposed to the mainstream denotational view on the theory of meaning, and
is influential in e.g. linguistics, linking up to the idea, commonly attributed to
Wittgenstein, that ‘meaning is use’. In proof theory, this idea links up with
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Gentzen’s famous observation about the introduction and elimination rules of
his natural deduction calculi:
‘The introductions represent, as it were, the definitions of the sym-
bols concerned, and the eliminations are no more, in the final ana-
lysis, than the consequences of these definitions. This fact may be
expressed as follows: In eliminating a symbol, we may use the for-
mula with whose terminal symbol we are dealing only in the sense
afforded it by the introduction of that symbol’. ([25] p. 80)
In the proof-theoretic semantic literature, this observation is brought to its
consequences: rather than viewing proofs as entities the meaning of which is
dependent on denotation, proof-theoretic semantics assigns proofs (in the sense
of formal deductions) an autonomous semantic role; that is, proofs are entities
in terms of which meaning can be accounted for.
Proof-theoretic semantics has inspired and unified much of the research in
structural proof theory focusing on the purely inferential characterization of
logical constants (i.e. logical connectives) in the setting of a given proof system.
2.2 Display calculi
Display calculi are among the approaches in structural proof theory aimed at
the uniform development of an inferential theory of meaning of logical constants
aligned with the ideas of proof-theoretic semantics. Display calculi have been
successful in giving adequate proof-theoretic accounts of logics—such as modal
logics and substructural logics—which have notoriously been difficult to treat
with other approaches. In particular, the contributions in this line of research
which are most relevant to our analysis are Belnap’s [15], Wansing’s [49], Goré’s
[28], and Restall’s [45].
Display Logic. Nuel Belnap introduced the first display calculus, which he
calls Display Logic [15], as a sequent system augmenting and refining Gentzen’s
basic observations on structural rules. Belnap’s refinement is based on the in-
troduction of a special syntax for the constituents of each sequent. Indeed, his
calculus treats sequents X ⊢ Y where X and Y are so-called structures, i.e.
syntactic objects inductively defined from formulas using an array of special
connectives. Belnap’s basic idea is that, in the standard Gentzen formulation,
the comma symbol ‘,’ separating formulas in the precedent and in the succedent
of sequents can be recognized as a metalinguistic connective, of which the struc-
tural rules define the behaviour.
Belnap took this idea further by admitting not only the comma, but also sev-
eral other connectives to keep formulas together in a structure, and called them
structural connectives. Just like the comma in standard Gentzen sequents is in-
terpreted contextually (that is, as conjunction when occurring on the left-hand
side and as disjunction when occurring on the right-hand side), each structural
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connective typically corresponds to a pair of logical connectives, and is inter-
preted as one or the other of them contextually (more of this in sections 5
and 6.1). Structural connectives maintain relations with one another, the most
fundamental of which take the form of adjunctions and residuations. These rela-
tions make it possible for the calculus to enjoy the powerful property which gives
it its name, namely, the display property. Before introducing it formally, let us
agree on some auxiliary definitions and nomenclature: structures are defined
much in the same way as formulas, taking formulas as atomic components and
closing under the given structural connectives; therefore, each structure can be
uniquely associated with a generation tree. Every node of such a generation tree
defines a substructure. A sequent X ⊢ Y is a pair of structures X,Y . The dis-
play property was introduced by Belnap, see Theorem 3.2 of [15] (where X ⊢ Y
is called a consecution and X the antecedent and Y the consequent):
Definition 1. A proof system enjoys the display property iff for every sequent
X ⊢ Y and every substructure Z of either X or Y , the sequent X ⊢ Y can be
equivalently transformed, using the rules of the system, into a sequent which
is either of the form Z ⊢ W or of the form W ⊢ Z, for some structure W . In
the first case, Z is displayed in precedent position, and in the second case, Z is
displayed in succedent position. The rules enabling this equivalent rewriting are
called display postulates.
Thanks to the fact that display postulates are based on adjunction and
residuation, in display calculi exactly one of the two alternatives mentioned in
the definition above occurs. In other words, in a system enjoying the display
property, any substructure of any sequent X ⊢ Y is always displayed either only
in precedent position or only in succedent position. This is why we can talk
about occurrences of substructures in precedent or in succedent position, even
if they are nested deep within a given sequent, as illustrated in the following
example:
Y ⊢ X > Z
X ;Y ⊢ Z
Y ;X ⊢ Z
X ⊢ Y > Z
In the derivation above, the structure X is on the right side of the turnstile,
but it is displayable on the left, and therefore is in precedent position. As we
will see next, the display property is a crucial technical ingredient for display
calculi, but it is also at the basis of Belnap’s methodology for characterizing
operational connectives: according to Belnap, any logical connective should be
introduced in isolation, i.e., when it is introduced, the context on the side it
has been introduced must be empty. The display property guarantees that this
condition is not too restrictive.
To illustrate the fundamental role played by the display property in the
transformation steps of the cut elimination metatheorem, consider the elimina-
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tion step of the following cut application, in which the cut formula is principal
on both premises of the cut.
.
.. pi1
X ⊢ A
.
.. pi2
Y ⊢ B
X ;Y ⊢ A ∧ B
.
.. pi
A ;B ⊢ Z
A ∧ B ⊢ Z
X ;Y ⊢ Z  
..
. pi2
Y ⊢ B
.
.. pi1
X ⊢ A
..
. pi
A ;B ⊢ Z
A ⊢ Z < B
X ⊢ Z < B
X ;B ⊢ Z
B ⊢ X > Z
Y ⊢ X > Z
X ; Y ⊢ Z
The dashed lines in the prooftree on the right-hand side correspond to ap-
plications of display postulates. Clearly, this transformation step has been made
possible because the display postulates disassemble, as it were, compound struc-
tures so as to give us access to the immediate subformulas of the original cut
formula, and then reassemble them so as to ‘put things back again’. Hence,
it is possible to break down the original cut into two cut applications on the
immediate subformulas, as required by the original Gentzen strategy.
Canonical cut elimination. In [15], a meta-theorem is proven, which gives
sufficient conditions in order for a sequent calculus to enjoy cut-elimination.1
This meta-theorem captures the essentials of the Gentzen-style cut-elimination
procedure, and is the main technical motivation for the design of Display Lo-
gic. Belnap’s meta-theorem gives a set of eight conditions on sequent calculi,
which are relatively easy to check, since most of them are verified by inspection
on the shape of the rules. Together, these conditions guarantee that the cut is
eliminable in the given sequent calculus, and that the calculus enjoys the subfor-
mula property. When Belnap’s metatheorem can be applied, it provides a much
smoother and more modular route to cut-elimination than the Gentzen-style
proofs. Moreover, as we will see later, a Belnap style cut-elimination theorem
is robust with respect to adding structural rules and with respect to adding
new logical connectives, whereas a Gentzen-style cut-elimination proof for the
modified system cannot be deduced from the old one, but must be proved from
scratch.
In a slogan, we could say that Belnap-style cut-elimination is to ordinary
cut-elimination what canonicity is to completeness: indeed, canonicity provides
a uniform strategy to achieve completeness. In the same way, the conditions
required by Belnap’s meta-theorem ensure that one and the same given set of
transformation steps is enough to achieve Gentzen-style cut elimination for any
system satisfying them.2
In what follows, we review and discuss eight conditions which are stronger
in certain respects than those in [15],3 and which define the notion of proper
1Note that, as Belnap observed on pag. 389 in [15]: ‘The eight conditions are supposed to
be a reminiscent of those of Curry’ in [18].
2The relationship between canonicity and Belnap-style cut-elimination is in fact more than
a mere analogy, see [32, Theorem 20].
3See also [16, 45] and the ‘second formulation’ of condition C6/7 in subsection 4.4 of [49].
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display calculus in [49].4
C1: Preservation of formulas. This condition requires each formula oc-
curring in a premise of a given inference to be the subformula of some formula
in the conclusion of that inference. That is, structures may disappear, but not
formulas. This condition is not included in the list of sufficient conditions of
the cut-elimination meta-theorem, but, in the presence of cut-elimination, it
guarantees the subformula property of a system. Condition C1 can be verified
by inspection on the shape of the rules.
C2: Shape-alikeness of parameters. This condition is based on the re-
lation of congruence between parameters (i.e., non-active parts) in inferences;
the congruence relation is an equivalence relation which is meant to identify the
different occurrences of the same formula or substructure along the branches
of a derivation [15, section 4], [45, Definition 6.5]. Condition C2 requires that
congruent parameters be occurrences of the same structure. This can be under-
stood as a condition on the design of the rules of the system if the congruence
relation is understood as part of the specification of each given rule; that is,
each rule of the system comes with an explicit specification of which elements
are congruent to which (and then the congruence relation is defined as the re-
flexive and transitive closure of the resulting relation). In this respect, C2 is
nothing but a sanity check, requiring that the congruence is defined in such a
way that indeed identifies the occurrences which are intuitively “the same”.
C3: Non-proliferation of parameters. Like the previous one, also this con-
dition is actually about the definition of the congruence relation on parameters.
Condition C3 requires that, for every inference (i.e. rule application), each of
its parameters is congruent to at most one parameter in the conclusion of that
inference. Hence, the condition stipulates that for a rule such as the following,
X ⊢ Y
X ;X ⊢ Y
the structure X from the premise is congruent to only one occurrence of X
in the conclusion sequent. Indeed, the introduced occurrence of X should be
considered congruent only to itself. Moreover, given that the congruence is
an equivalence relation, condition C3 implies that, within a given sequent, any
substructure is congruent only to itself.
Remark 1. Conditions C2 and C3 make it possible to follow the history of a
formula along the branches of any given derivation. In particular, C3 implies
that the the history of any formula within a given derivation has the shape of a
tree, which we refer to as the history-tree of that formula in the given derivation.
Notice, however, that the history-tree of a formula might have a different shape
than the portion of the underlying derivation corresponding to it; for instance,
4See the ‘first formulation’ of conditions C6, C7 in subsection 4.1 of [49].
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the following application of the Contraction rule gives rise to a bifurcation of
the history-tree of A which is absent in the underlying branch of the derivation
tree, given that Contraction is a unary rule.
...
A ;A ⊢ X
A ⊢ X
t
t
t t
❅
❅ 
 
t
C4: Position-alikeness of parameters. This condition bans any rule in
which a (sub)structure in precedent (resp. succedent) position in a premise is
congruent to a (sub)structure in succedent (resp. precedent) position in the
conclusion.
C5: Display of principal constituents. This condition requires that any
principal occurrence be always either the entire antecedent or the entire con-
sequent part of the sequent in which it occurs. In the following section, a
generalization of this condition will be discussed, in view of its application to
the main focus of interest of the present paper.
The following conditions C6 and C7 are not reported below as they are stated
in the original paper [15], but as they appear in [49, subsection 4.1]. More about
this difference is discussed in section 7.2.
C6: Closure under substitution for succedent parameters. This condi-
tion requires each rule to be closed under simultaneous substitution of arbitrary
structures for congruent formulas which occur in succedent position. Condition
C6 ensures, for instance, that if the following inference is an application of the
rule R:
(X ⊢ Y )
(
[A]suci | i ∈ I
)
R
(X ′ ⊢ Y ′)[A]suc
and
(
[A]suci | i ∈ I
)
represents all and only the occurrences of A in the premiss
which are congruent to the occurrence of A in the conclusion5, then also the
following inference is an application of the same rule R:
(X ⊢ Y )
(
[Z/A]suci | i ∈ I
)
R
(X ′ ⊢ Y ′)[Z/A]suc
where the structure Z is substituted for A.
This condition caters for the step in the cut elimination procedure in which the
cut needs to be “pushed up” over rules in which the cut-formula in succedent
position is parametric. Indeed, condition C6 guarantees that, in the picture
below, a well-formed subtree π1[Y/A] can be obtained from π1 by replacing any
5Clearly, if I = ∅, then the occurrence of A in the conclusion is congruent to itself.
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occurrence of A corresponding to a node in the history tree of the cut-formula
A by Y , and hence the following transformation step is guaranteed go through
uniformly and “canonically”:
... pi
′
1
X′ ⊢ A
... pi1
X ⊢ A
... pi2
A ⊢ Y
X ⊢ Y  
... pi
′
1
X′ ⊢ A
... pi2
A ⊢ Y
X′ ⊢ Y
... pi1[Y/A]
X ⊢ Y
if each rule in π1 verifies condition C6.
C7: Closure under substitution for precedent parameters. This condi-
tion requires each rule to be closed under simultaneous substitution of arbitrary
structures for congruent formulas which occur in precedent position. Condition
C7 can be understood analogously to C6, relative to formulas in precedent pos-
ition. Therefore, for instance, if the following inference is an application of the
rule R:
(X ⊢ Y )
(
[A]prei | i ∈ I
)
R
(X ′ ⊢ Y ′)[A]pre
then also the following inference is an instance of R:
(X ⊢ Y )
(
[Z/A]prei | i ∈ I
)
R
(X ′ ⊢ Y ′)[Z/A]pre
Similarly to what has been discussed for condition C6, condition C7 caters for
the step in the cut elimination procedure in which the cut needs to be “pushed
up” over rules in which the cut-formula in precedent position is parametric.
C8: Eliminability of matching principal constituents. This condition
requests a standard Gentzen-style checking, which is now limited to the case
in which both cut formulas are principal, i.e. each of them has been introduced
with the last rule application of each corresponding subdeduction. In this case,
analogously to the proof Gentzen-style, condition C8 requires being able to
transform the given deduction into a deduction with the same conclusion in
which either the cut is eliminated altogether, or is transformed in one or more
applications of cut involving proper subformulas of the original cut-formulas.
Rules introducing logical connectives. In display calculi, these rules, some-
times referred to as operational rules as opposed to the structural rules, typically
occur in two flavors: operational rules which translate one structural connective
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in the premises in the corresponding connective in the conclusion, and opera-
tional rules in which both the operational connective and its structural counter-
part are introduced in the conclusion. An example of this pattern is provided
below for the case of the modal operator ‘diamond’:
◦A ⊢ X
3L
3A ⊢ X
X ⊢ A
3R
◦X ⊢ 3A
This introduction pattern obeys very strict criteria, which will be expanded on
in the next subsection. From this example, it is clear that the introduction rules
capture the rock bottom behavior of the logical connective in question; addi-
tional properties (for instance, normality, in the case in point), which might
vary depending on the logical system, are to be captured at the level of ad-
ditional (purely structural) rules. This enforces a clear-cut division of labour
between operational rules, which only encode the basic proof-theoretic meaning
of logical connectives, and structural rules, which account for all extra relations
and properties, and which can be modularly added or removed, thus accounting
for the space of logics.
Summing up, the two main benefits of display calculi are a “canonical” proof
of cut elimination, and an explicit and modular account of logical connectives.
2.3 Wansing’s criteria
In [49, subsubsection 1.3], referring to the well known idea that ‘a proof-theoretic
semantics exemplifies the Wittgensteinian slogan that meaning is use’, Wansing
stresses that, for this slogan to serve as a conceptual basis for a general inferential
theory of meaning, ‘use’ should be understood as ‘correct use’. The consequences
of the idea of meaning as correct use then precipitate into the following principles
for the introduction rules for operational connectives, which he discusses in the
same subsection and which are reported below. These principles are hence to
be understood as the general requirements a (sequent-style) proof system needs
to satisfy in order to encode the correct use, and hence for being suitable for
proof-theoretic semantics.
Separation. This principle requires that the introduction rules for a given
connective f should not exhibit any other connective rather than f . Hence
the meaning of a given operational connective cannot be dependent from any
other operational connectives. For instance, the following rule does not satisfy
separation:
2Γ ⊢ A,3∆
2Γ ⊢ 2A ,3∆
This criterion does not ban the possibility of defining composite connectives;
however, it ensures that the dependence relation between connectives creates
no vicious circles. In fact, as it is formulated, this criterion is much stronger,
since it requires every connective to be independent of any other.
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Isolation. This is a stronger requirement than separation, and stipulates that,
in addition, the precedent (resp. succedent) of the conclusion sequent in a left
(resp. right) introduction rule must not exhibit any structure operation. In [15],
Belnap explains this requirement by remarking that an introduction rule with
nonempty context on the principal side would fail to account for the meaning
of the logical connective involved in a context-independent way.
Segregation. This is an even stronger requirement than isolation, and stipu-
lates that, in addition, also the auxiliary formulas in the premise(s) must occur
within an empty context. This property appears under the name of visibility in
[14].6
Weak symmetry. This requirement stipulates that each introduction rule for
a given connective f should either belong to a set of rules (f ⊢) which introduce
f on the left-hand side of the turnstile ⊢ in the conclusion sequent, or to a set
of rules (⊢ f) which introduce f on the right-hand side of the turnstile ⊢ in the
conclusion sequent. Understanding the either-or as exclusive disjunction, this
criterion prevents an operational connective to be introduced on both sides by
the application of one and the same rule. Thus, weak symmetry stipulates that
the sets (f ⊢) and (⊢ f) be disjoint. However, weak symmetry does not exclude
that either (f ⊢) or (⊢ f) be empty.
Symmetry. This condition strengthens weak symmetry by requiring both
(f ⊢) and (⊢ f) to be nonempty for each connective f . Rather than a re-
quirement on individual rules, this principle is a requirement on the set of the
introduction rules for any given connective. Notice that symmetry does not
exclude the possibility of having, for instance, two rules that introduce a given
connective on the left and one that introduces it on the right side of the turnstile.
Weak explicitness. An introduction rule for f is weakly explicit if f occurs
only in the conclusion of a rule and not in its premisses.
Explicitness. An introduction rule for f is explicit if it is weakly explicit and
in addition to this, f appears only once in the conclusion of the rule.
The following principles are of a more global nature, which involves the proof
system as a whole:
Unique characterization. This principle requires each logical connective to
be uniquely characterized by its behaviour in the system, in the following sense.
Let Λ be a logical system with a syntactic presentation S in which f occurs. Let
S∗ be the result of rewriting f everywhere in S as f∗, and let ΛΛ∗ be the system
6In [24], following ideas from [14], the visibility property has been identified as an essential
ingredient to generalise Belnap’s metatheorem beyond display calculi.
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presented by the union SS∗ of S and S∗ in the combined language with both
f and f∗. Let Af denote a formula (in this language) that contains a certain
occurrence of f , and let Af∗ denote the result of replacing this occurrence of f
in Af by f
∗. The connectives f and f∗ are uniquely characterized in ΛΛ∗ (cfr.
[49, subsubsection 1.4]) if for every formula Af in the language of ΛΛ
∗, Af is
provable in SS∗ iff Af∗ is provable in SS
∗.
Došen’s principle. Hilbert style presentations are modular in the following
sense: if Λ1 and Λ2 are finitely axiomatizable logics over the same language
and Λ1 is stronger than Λ2, then an axiomatization of Λ2 can be obtained from
one of Λ1 by adding finitely many axioms to it. This makes it possible to
modularly generate all finite axiomatic extensions of a given logic. Although it
is arguably more difficult to achieve an analogous degree of modularity in the
sequent calculi presentation, a principle aimed to achieve it has been advocated
by Wansing under the name of Došen’s principle (cfr. [49, subsubsection 1.5]):
“The rules for the logical operations are never changed; all changes are made in
the structural rules”. Thus, suitable finite axiomatic extensions of a given logic
L can be captured by adding structural rules to the proof system associated with
L. Display calculi are particularly suitable to implement Došen’s principle. As
remarked early on, besides featuring structural rules which encode properties of
single structural connectives (which is the case e.g. of the rule exchange), display
calculi typically feature rules which concern the interaction between different
structural connectives (the adjunction between two structural connectives is an
example of the latter type of rule, see for instance the rules applied in the
example on page 6).
Cut-eliminability. Finally, Wansing considers the eliminability of the cut
rule as an important requirement for the proof-theoretic semantics of logical
connectives.
3 Belnap-style metatheorem for quasi proper dis-
play calculi
In the present section, we discuss a slight extension of Wansing’s notion of
proper display calculus (cf. Subsection 2.2), and prove its associated Belnap-
style cut elimination metatheorem. The cut elimination for the calculus D’.EAK
introduced in Section 6.3 (see also Appendix B) will be derived as an instance
of the metatheorem below.
3.1 Quasi proper display calculi
Definition 2. A sequent calculus is a quasi proper display calculus if it verifies
conditions C1, C2, C3, C4, C6, C7, C8 of section 2.2, and moreover it satisfies
the following conditions C′5, C
′′
5 and C
′
8:
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C′5: Quasi-display of principal constituents. If a formula A is principal
in the conclusion sequent s of a derivation π, then A is in display, unless π
consists only of its conclusion sequent s (i.e. s is an axiom).
C′′5 : Display-invariance of axioms. If a display rule can be applied to an
axiom s, the result of that rule application is again an axiom.
C′8: Closure of axioms under cut. If X ⊢ A and A ⊢ Y are axioms, then
X ⊢ Y is again an axiom.
Notice that condition C5 in Subsection 2.2 is stronger than both C
′
5 and C
′′
5 ,
and that the strength of condition C′5 is intermediate between that of C5 and
of the following one, appearing in [45, Definition 6.8]:
C′′′5 : Single principal constituents. This condition requires that, in the
conclusion of any rule, there be at most one non-parametric formula—which is
the formula introduced by the application of the rule in question—unless the
rule is an axiom.
The above condition C′′′5 is introduced in [45] within a setting accounting
for sequent calculi which do not necessarily enjoy the full display property. The
calculi considered in [45] are such that the introduction rules do not need to
enjoy the requirement of isolation (cf. Chapter 6), and the (multiple) cut rule
applies at any depth. The calculus introduced in Section 6.1 enjoys the full
display property, therefore the following cut rule, in which both cut formulas
occur in isolation:
X ⊢ A A ⊢ Y
Cut
X ⊢ Y
will be taken as primitive in it without loss of generality, as is standardly done in
display calculi. However, the calculus in Section 6.1 fails to enjoy the property
of isolation, which typically plays a role in the cut elimination metatheorem
for display calculi, and indeed appears in [49] as condition C5. In the next
subsection, we show that, even when the cut rule is the one above, requiring the
combination of C′5 and C
′′
5 suffices.
7
3.2 Belnap-style metatheorem
The aim of the present subsection is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Any calculus satisfying conditions C2, C3, C4, C
′
5, C
′′
5 , C6, C7,
C8, and C
′
8 enjoys cut elimination. If C1 is also satisfied, then the calculus
enjoys the subformula property.
7In [23], we give a metatheorem which is based on a different tradeoff: on the one hand,
we will not require the full display property, but on the other we will require a condition close
to segregation.
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Proof. This is a generalization of the proof in [51, Section 3.3, Appendix A].
For the sake of conciseness, we will expand only on the parts of the proof which
depart from that treatment.
Our original derivation is
... π1
X ⊢ A
... π2
A ⊢ Y
X ⊢ Y
Principal stage: both cut formulas are principal. There are three sub-
cases.
If the end sequent X ⊢ Y is identical to the conclusion of π1 (resp. π2), then
we can eliminate the cut simply replacing the derivation above with π1 (resp.
π2).
If the premises X ⊢ A and A ⊢ Y are axioms, then, by C′8, the conclusion
X ⊢ Y is an axiom, therefore the cut can be eliminated by simply replacing the
original derivation with X ⊢ Y .
If one of the two premises of the cut in the original derivation is not an
axiom, then, by C8, there is a proof of X ⊢ Y which uses the same premise(s)
of the original derivation and which involves only cuts on proper subformulas
of A.
Parametric stage: at least one cut formula is parametric. There are
two subcases: either one cut formula is principal or they are both parametric.
Consider the subcase in which one cut formula is principal. W.l.o.g. we
assume that the cut-formula A is principal in the the left-premise X ⊢ A of the
cut in the original proof (the other case is symmetric). As discussed in Remark
1, conditions C2 and C3 make it possible to consider the history-tree of the
right-hand-side cut formula A in π2. The situation can be pictured as follows:
... π1
X ⊢ A
... π2.i
Ai ⊢ Yi
. . .
... π2.j
(Xj ⊢ Yj)[Aj ]
pre
...
... π2.k
(Xk ⊢ Yk)[Ak]
pre
. .
.
. . .
... . .
. π2
A ⊢ Y
X ⊢ Y
where, for i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the nodes
Ai ⊢ Yi, (Xj ⊢ Yj)[Aj ]
pre, and (Xk ⊢ Yk)[Ak]
pre
represent the three ways in which the leaves Ai, Aj and Ak in the history-tree of
A in π2 can be introduced, and which will be discussed below. The notation A
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and (resp. A) indicates that the given occurrence is principal (resp. parametric).
Notice that condition C4 guarantees that all occurrences in the history of A are
in precedent position in the underlying derivation tree.
Let Al be introduced as a parameter (as represented in the picture above
in the conclusion of π2.k for Al = Ak). Assume that (Xk ⊢ Yk)[Ak] is the
conclusion of an application inf of the rule Ru (for instance, in the calculus of
section 6.1, this situation arises if Ak has been introduced with an application
of Weakening). Since Ak is a leaf in the history-tree of A, we have that Ak is
congruent only to itself in Xk ⊢ Yk. Hence, C7 implies that it is possible to
substitute X for Ak by means of an application of the same rule Ru. That is,
(Xk ⊢ Yk)[Ak] can be replaced by (Xk ⊢ Yk)[X/Ak].
Let Al be introduced as a principal formula. The corresponding subcase in
[51] splits into two subsubcases: either Al is introduced in display or it is not.
If Al is in display (as represented in the picture above in the conclusion of
π2.i for Al = Ai), then we form a subderivation using π1 and π2.i and applying
cut as the last rule.
If Al is not in display (as represented in the picture above in the conclusion
of π2.j for Al = Aj), then condition C
′
5 implies that (Xj ⊢ Yj)[Aj ]
pre is an
axiom (so, in particular, there is at least another occurrence of A in succedent
position), and C′′5 implies that some axiom Aj ⊢ Y
′
j exists, which is display-
equivalent to the first axiom, and in which Aj occurs in display. Let π
′ be
the derivation which transforms Aj ⊢ Y
′
i into (Xj ⊢ Yj)[Aj ]
pre. We form a
subderivation using π1 and Aj ⊢ Y
′
j and joining them with a cut application,
then attaching π′[X/Aj ]
pre below the new cut.
The transformations just discussed explain how to transform the leaves of
the history tree of A. Finally, condition C7 implies that substituting X for each
occurrence of A in the history tree of the cut formula A in π2 (or in a display-
equivalent proof π′) gives rise to an admissible derivation π2[X/A]
pre (use C6
for the symmetric case).
Summing up, this procedure generates the following proof tree:
... π1
X ⊢ A
... π2.i
Ai ⊢ Yi
X ⊢ Yi
. . .
... π1
X ⊢ A Aj ⊢ Y
′[A]suc
X ⊢ Y ′[A]suc
... π
′[X/A]pre
(Xj ⊢ Yj)[X/Aj ]
pre[A]suc
...
... π2.k
(Xk ⊢ Yk)[X/Ak]
pre
. .
.
. . .
... . .
. π2[X/A]
pre
X ⊢ Y
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If, in the original derivation, the history-tree of the cut formula A (in the
right-hand-side premise of the given cut application) contains at most one leaf
Al which is principal, then the height of the new cuts is lower than the height
of the original cut.
If, in the original derivation, the history-tree of the cut formula A (in the
right-hand-side premise of the given cut application) contains more than one leaf
Al which is principal, then we cannot conclude that the height of the new cuts
is always lower than the height of the original cut (for instance, in the calculus
introduced in Section 6.1, this situation may arise when two ancestors of a cut
formula are introduced as principal, and then are identified via an application
of the rule Contraction). In this case, we observe that in each newly introduced
application of the cut rule, both cut formulas are principal. Hence, we can
apply the procedure described in the Principal stage and transform the original
derivation in a derivation in which the cut formulas of the newly introduced
cuts have strictly lower complexity than the original cut formula.
Finally, as to the subcase in which both cut formulas are parametric, consider
a proof with at least one cut. The procedure is analogous to the previous case.
Namely, following the history of one of the cut formulas up to the leaves, and
applying the transformation steps described above, we arrive at a situation in
which, whenever new applications of cuts are generated, in each such application
at least one of the cut formulas is principal. To each such cut, we can apply
(the symmetric version of) the Parametric stage described so far.
4 Dynamic Epistemic Logics and their proof sys-
tems
In the present section, we first review the two best known logical systems in the
family of dynamic epistemic logics, namely public announcement logic (PAL)
[44], and the logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (EAK) [12], focusing
mainly on the latter one. Our presentation in subsection 4.1 is different but
equivalent to the original version from [12] (without common knowledge), and
rather follows the presentation given in [39] and in [30]. In subsections 4.3
and 4.4 we discuss their existing proof-theoretic formalizations, particularly in
relation to the viewpoint of proof-theoretic semantics, and mention the system
D.EAK as a promising approximation of a setting for proof-theoretic semantics.
Finally, in subsection 5, we discuss the final coalgebra semantics, since this is a
semantic environment in which all connectives of the language of D.EAK (and
of its improved version D’.EAK) can be naturally interpreted.
4.1 The logic of epistemic actions and knowledge
The logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (further on EAK) is a logical
framework which combines a multi-modal classical logic with a dynamic-type
propositional logic. Static modalities in EAK are parametrized with agents,
and their intended interpretation is epistemic, that is, 〈a〉A intuitively stands
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for ‘agent a thinks that A might be the case’. Dynamic modalities in EAK
are parametrized with epistemic action-structures (defined below) and their
intended interpretation is analogous to that of dynamic modalities in e.g. Pro-
positional Dynamic Logic. That is, 〈α〉A intuitively stands for ‘the action α is
executable, and after its execution A is the case’. Informally, action structures
loosely resemble Kripke models, and encode information about epistemic actions
such as e.g. public announcements, private announcements to a group of agents,
with or without (actual or suspected) wiretapping, etc. Action structures con-
sist of a finite nonempty domain of action-states, a designated state, binary
relations on the domain for each agent, and a precondition map. Each state
in the domain of an action structure α represents the possible appearance of
the epistemic action encoded by α. The designated state represents the action
actually taking place. Each binary relation of an action structure represents
the type, or degree, of uncertainty entertained by the agent associated with the
given binary relation about the action taking place; for instance, the agents’
knowledge, ignorance, suspicions. Finally, the precondition function maps each
state in the domain to a formula, which is intended to describe the state of
affairs under which it is possible to execute the (appearing) action encoded by
the given state. This formula encodes the preconditions of the action-state. The
reader is referred to [12] for further intuition and concrete examples.
Let AtProp be a countable set of atomic propositions, and Ag be a nonempty
set (of agents). The set L of formulas A of the logic of epistemic actions and
knowledge (EAK), and the set Act(L) of the action structures α over L are
defined simultaneously as follows:
A := p ∈ AtProp | ¬A | A ∨ A | 〈a〉A | 〈α〉A (α ∈ Act(L), a ∈ Ag),
where an action structure over L is a tuple α = (K, k, (αa)a∈Ag, P reα), such
that K is a finite nonempty set, k ∈ K, αa ⊆ K ×K and Preα : K → L.
The symbol Pre(α) stands for Preα(k). For each action structure α and
every i ∈ K, let αi := (K, i, (αa)a∈Ag, P reα). Intuitively, the family of action
structures {αi | kαai} encodes the uncertainty of agent a about the action
α = αk that is actually taking place. Perhaps the best known epistemic actions
are public announcements, formalized as action structures α such that K = {k},
and αa = {(k, k)} for all a ∈ Ag. The logic of public announcements (PAL) [44]
can then be subsumed as the fragment of EAK restricted to action structures
of the form described above. The connectives ⊤, ⊥, ∧, → and ↔ are defined as
usual.
Standard models for EAK are relational structures M = (W, (Ra)a∈Ag, V )
such thatW is a nonempty set, Ra ⊆W×W for each a ∈ Ag, and V : AtProp→
P(W ). The interpretation of the static fragment of the language is standard.
For every Kripke frame F = (W, (Ra)a∈Ag) and each action structure α, let the
Kripke frame
∐
αF := (
∐
KW, ((R×α)a)a∈Ag) be defined as follows:
∐
K W is
the |K|-fold coproduct of W (which is set-isomorphic to W ×K), and (R×α)a
is a binary relation on
∐
K W defined as
(w, i)(R × α)a(u, j) iff wRau and iαaj.
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For every model M and each action structure α, let∐
α
M := (
∐
α
F ,
∐
K
V )
be such that
∐
α F is defined as above, and (
∐
K V )(p) :=
∐
K V (p) for every
p ∈ AtProp. Finally, let the update of M with the action structure α be the
submodel Mα := (Wα, (Rα
a
)a∈Ag, V
α) of
∐
αM the domain of which is the
subset
Wα := {(w, j) ∈
∐
K
W |M,w  Preα(j)}.
Given this preliminary definition, formulas of the form 〈α〉A are interpreted as
follows:
M,w  〈α〉A iff M,w  Preα(k) and M
α, (w, k)  A.
The model Mα is intended to encode the (factual and epistemic) state of
affairs after the execution of the action α. Summing up, the construction ofMα
is done in two stages: in the first stage, as many copies of the original model
M are taken as there are ‘epistemic potential appearances’ of the given action
(encoded by the action states in the domain of α); in the second stage, states
in the copies are removed if their associated original state does not satisfy the
preconditions of their paired action-state.
A complete axiomatization of EAK consists of copies of the axioms and rules
of the minimal normal modal logic K for each modal operator, either epistemic
or dynamic, plus the following (interaction) axioms:
〈α〉p ↔ (Pre(α) ∧ p); (1)
〈α〉¬A ↔ (Pre(α) ∧ ¬〈α〉A); (2)
〈α〉(A ∨B) ↔ (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B); (3)
〈α〉〈a〉A ↔ (Pre(α) ∧
∨
{〈a〉〈αi〉A | kαai}). (4)
The interaction axioms above can be understood as attempts at defining the
meaning of any given dynamic modality 〈α〉 in terms of its interaction with the
other connectives. In particular, while axioms (2) and (3) occur also in other
dynamic logics such as PDL, axioms (1) and (4) capture the specific behaviour of
epistemic actions. Specifically, axiom (1) encodes the fact that epistemic actions
do not change the factual state of affairs, and axiom (4) plausibly rephrases the
fact that ‘after the execution of α, agent a thinks that A might be the case’ in
terms of ‘there being some epistemic appearance of α to a such that a thinks
that, after its execution, A is the case’. An interesting aspect of these axioms
is that they work as rewriting rules which can be iteratively used to transform
any EAK-formula into an equivalent one free of dynamic modalities. Hence, the
completeness of EAK follows from the completeness of its static fragment, and
EAK is not more expressive than its static fragment. However, and interestingly,
there is an exponential gap in succinctness between equivalent formulas in the
two languages [38].
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Action structures are one among many possible ways to represent actions.
Following [30], we prefer to keep a black-box perspective on actions, and to
identify agents a with the indistinguishability relation they induce on actions;
so, in the remainder of the article, the role of the action-structures αi for kαi
will be played by actions β such that αaβ, allowing us to reformulate (4) as
〈α〉〈a〉A ↔ (Pre(α) ∧
∨
{〈a〉〈β〉A | αaβ}).
4.2 The intuitionistic version of EAK
In [39, 35], an analysis of PAL and EAK has been given from the point of view of
algebraic semantics, resulting in the definition of the intuitionistic counterparts
of PAL and EAK. In the present subsection, we briefly review the definition
of the latter one, as it reveals a more subtle interaction between the various
modalities, thus preparing the ground for the even richer picture that will arise
from the proof-theoretic analysis.
Let AtProp be a countable set of atomic propositions, and let Ag be a
nonempty set (of agents). The set L(m-IK) of the formulas A of the multi-
modal version m-IK of Fischer Servi’s intuitionistic modal logic IK are induct-
ively defined as follows:
A := p ∈ AtProp | ⊥ | A ∨A | A ∧A | A→ A | 〈a〉A | [a]A (a ∈ Ag)
The logic m-IK is the smallest set of formulas in the language L(m-IK)
(where ¬A abbreviates as usual A → ⊥) containing the following axioms and
closed under modus ponens and necessitation rules:
Axioms
A→ (B → A)
(A→ (B → C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
A→ (B → A ∧B)
A ∧B → A
A ∧B → B
A→ A ∨B
B → A ∨B
(A→ C)→ ((B → C)→ (A ∨B → C))
⊥ → A
[a](A→ B)→ ([a]A→ [a]B)
〈a〉(A ∨B)→ 〈a〉A ∨ 〈a〉B
¬〈a〉⊥
FS1 〈a〉(A→ B)→ ([a]A→ 〈a〉B)
FS2 (〈a〉A→ [a]B)→ [a](A→ B)
Inference Rules
MP if ⊢ A→ B and ⊢ A, then ⊢ B
Nec if ⊢ A, then ⊢ [a]A
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To define the language of the intuitionistic counterpart of EAK, let AtProp be
a countable set of atomic propositions, and let Ag be a nonempty set. The set
L(IEAK) of the formulas A of the intuitionistic logic of epistemic actions and
knowledge (IEAK), and the set Act(L) of the action structures α over L are
defined simultaneously as follows:
A := p ∈ AtProp | ⊥ | A→ A | A ∨ A | A ∧ A | 〈a〉A | [a]A | 〈α〉A | [α]A,
where a ∈ Ag, and an action structure α over L(IEAK) is defined in just the
same way as action structures in section 4.1. Then, the logic IEAK is defined in
a Hilbert-style presentation which includes the axioms and rules of m-IK plus
the Fischer Servi axioms FS1 and FS2 for each dynamic modal operator, plus
the following axioms and rules:
Interaction Axioms
〈α〉p↔ Pre(α) ∧ p
[α]p↔ Pre(α)→ p
〈α〉⊥ ↔ ⊥
〈α〉⊤ ↔ Pre(α)
[α]⊤ ↔ ⊤
[α]⊥ ↔ ¬Pre(α)
[α](A ∧B)↔ [α]A ∧ [α]B
〈α〉(A ∧B)↔ 〈α〉A ∧ 〈α〉B
〈α〉(A ∨B)↔ 〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B
[α](A ∨B)↔ Pre(α) → (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B)
〈α〉(A→ B)↔ Pre(α) ∧ (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B)
[α](A→ B)↔ 〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B
〈α〉〈a〉A↔ Pre(α) ∧
∨
{〈a〉〈β〉A | αaβ}
[α]〈a〉A↔ Pre(α)→
∨
{〈a〉〈β〉A | αaβ}
[α][a]A↔ Pre(α)→
∧
{[a][β]A | αaβ}
〈α〉[a]A↔ Pre(α) ∧
∧
{[a][β]A | αaβ}
Inference Rules
Nec if ⊢ A, then ⊢ [α]A
4.3 Proof theoretic formalisms for PAL and DEL
In the present subsection, we discuss the most relevant existing proof-theoretic
accounts [9, 42, 41, 11, 19, 6, 7, 8] for the logic of public announcements [44]
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and for the logic of epistemic actions and knowledge [12].
Labelled tableaux for PAL. In [9], a labelled tableaux system is proposed
for public announcement logic. This system is sound and complete with re-
spect to the semantics of PAL. Moreover, the computational complexity of this
tableaux system is shown to be optimal for satisfiability checking in the lan-
guage of PAL. The system manipulates triples, called labelled formulas, of the
form 〈µ, n, φ〉 such that µ is a (possibly empty) list of PAL-formulas, n is a
natural number, and φ is a PAL-formula. Intuitively, the tuple 〈µ, n〉 stands
for an epistemic state of the model updated with a sequence of announcements
encoded by µ. To give a closer impression of this tableaux system, consider the
following rule:
〈(α1, ..., αk), n,¬KaA〉
RK̂ n′ fresh〈ǫ, n′,¬[α1]...[αk]A〉 : 〈a, n, n
′〉
This rule can be read as follows: if a state n does not satisfy KaA after
the sequence of announcements α1, ..., αk, then at least one of its Ra-successor
states n′ in the original model, represented by the tuple 〈ǫ, n′〉 in the rule, must
survive the updates and not satisfy A. Hence, 〈ǫ, n′〉 must satisfy the formula
〈α1〉...〈αk〉¬A, which is classically equivalent to ¬[α1]...[αk]A.
Clearly, rules such as this one incorporate the relational semantics of PAL.
This is not satisfactory from the point of view of proof-theoretic semantics,
since it prevents these rules from providing an independent contribution to the
meaning of the logical connectives. A second issue, of a more technical nature,
is that the statement of this rule is grounded on the classical interdefinability
between the box-type and diamond-type modalities. This implies that if we
dispense with the classical propositional base, we would need to reformulate
this rule. Hence the calculus is non-modular in the sense discussed in section
2.3.
Labelled sequent calculi for PAL. In [42] and [41], cut-free labelled se-
quent calculi for PAL are introduced with truthful and non-truthful announce-
ments, respectively. Also in this case, the statement of the rules of these calculi
incorporates the relational semantics. For instance, this is illustrated here below
for the case of truthful announcements.
w :µ,α A,w :µ [α]A,w :µ α,Γ ⊢ ∆
L[ ]:µ
w :µ [α]A,w :µ α,Γ ⊢ ∆
w :µ α,Γ ⊢ ∆, w :µ,α A
R[ ]:µ
Γ ⊢ ∆, w :µ [α]A
In the rules above, symbols such as w :µ A can be rearranged and then
understood as the labelled formulas 〈µ,w,A〉 in the tableaux system presented
before. The only difference is that w is an individual variable which stands for
a given state of a relational structure, and not for a natural number; however,
this difference is completely nonessential. Under this interpretation, it is clear
22
that e.g. the rule L[ ]:µ encodes the relational satisfaction clause of [α]A, when
α is a truthful announcement. The following rules are also part of the calculi.
v : A,w : KaA,wRav,Γ ⊢ ∆
LKa
w : KaA,wRav,Γ ⊢ ∆
wRav,Γ ⊢ ∆, v : A
RKa
Γ ⊢ ∆, w : KaA
Besides the individual variables w and v, the rules above feature the binary
relation symbol Ra encoding the epistemic uncertainty of the agent a. Since
the relational semantics is imported in the definitions of the rules, the same
issues pointed out in the case of the tableaux system appear also here. On
the other hand, importing the relational semantics allows for some remarkable
extra power. Indeed, the interaction axiom (4) can be derived from the four rules
above, which deal with static and dynamic modalities in complete independence
of one another.
Merging different logics. In [11] and [19], sequent calculi have been defined
for dynamic logics arising in an algebraic way, motivated by program semantics,
with a methodology introduced by [1]. Essentially, this approach is based on
the idea of merging a linear-type logic of actions (more precisely, [40]) with a
classical or intuitionistic logic of propositions. Following the treatment of [1],
this logic arises semantically as the logic of certain quantale-modules, namely
of maps ⋆ : M × Q → M , preserving complete joins in each coordinate, where
Q is a quantale and M is a complete join-semilattice. Each q ∈ Q induces
a completely join-preserving operation (− ⋆ q) : M → M , which, by general
order-theoretic facts, has a unique right adjoint [q] : M →M . That is, for every
m,m′ ∈M ,
m ⋆ q ≤ m′ iff m ≤ [q]m′. (5)
Intuitively, the elements of Q are actions (or rather, inverses of actions), and
M is an algebra interpreting propositions, which in the best known cases arises
as the complex algebra of some relational structure, and therefore will be e.g. a
complete and atomic Boolean algebra with operators. Thus the framework of
[11] and [19] is vastly more general than dynamic epistemic logic as it is usually
understood. A remarkable feature of this setting is that the dynamic operations
which are intended as the interpretation of the primitive dynamic connectives
arise in this setting as adjoints of “more primitive” operations; thus, and much
more importantly, every dynamic modality comes with its adjoint. Moreover,
every epistemic modality (parametrized as usual with an agent) comes in two
copies: one as an operation on Q and one as an operation on M , and these
two copies are stipulated to interact in a suitable way. More formally, the
semantic structures are defined as tuples (M,Q, {fA}A∈Ag), where M and Q
are as above, and for every agent A, fA is a pair of completely join preserving
maps (fMA : M → M, f
Q
A : Q → Q) such that the following three conditions
hold:
fQA (q · q
′) ≤ fQA (q) · f
Q
A (q
′) (6)
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fMA (m ⋆ q) ≤ f
M
A (m) ⋆ f
Q
A (q) (7)
1 ≤ fQA (1). (8)
Intuitively, for every agent A, the operation fMA is the diamond-type modal
operator encoding the epistemic uncertainty of A, and fQA is the diamond-type
modal operator encoding the epistemic uncertainty of A about the action that
is actually taking place. Given this understanding, condition (7) hardcodes the
following well-known DEL-axiom in the semantic structures above:
∧
{[A][q′]m | qAq′} ⊢ [q][A]m. (9)
where the notation qAq′ means that the action q′ is indistinguishable from q
for the agent A. In (7), the element fQA (q) encodes the join of all such actions.
Because ⋆ is bilinear, we get:
fMA (m) ⋆ f
Q
A (q) = f
M
A (m) ⋆
∨
Q
{q′ | qAq′} =
∨
M
{fMA (m) ⋆ q
′ | qAq′}.
Hence, (7) can be equivalently rewritten in the form of a rule as follows:∨
{fMA (m) ⋆ q
′ | qAq′} ⊢ m′
fMA (m ⋆ q) ⊢ m
′
Applying adjunction to the premise and to the conclusion gets us to:
m ⊢
∧
{[A][q′]m′ | qAq′}
m ⊢ [q][A]m′
Finally, rewriting the rule above back as an inequality gets us to (9). The first
pioneering proposal is the sequent calculus developed in [11]. This calculus
manipulates two kinds of sequents: Q-sequents, of the form Γ ⊢Q q, where q is
an action and Γ is a sequence of actions and agents, and M-sequents, of the form
Γ ⊢M m, where m is a proposition and Γ is a sequence of propositions, actions
and agents. These different entailment relations need to be brought together by
means of rules of hybrid type, such as the left one below.
m′ ⊢M m ΓQ ⊢Q q
DyL
[q]m′,ΓQ ⊢M m
Γ, q ⊢M m
DyR
Γ ⊢M [q]m
As to the soundness of the rule DyL, let us identify the logical symbols
with their interpretation, assume that the inequalities m ≤ m′ and ΓQ ≤ q are
satisfied on given M and Q respectively,8 and prove that [q]m′,ΓQ ≤ m in M .
Indeed,
[q]m′ ⋆ ΓQ ≤ [q]m
′ ⋆ q ≤ m′ ≤ m.
8where ΓQ now stands for a suitable product in Q of the interpretations of its individual
components.
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The first inequality follows from ΓQ ≤ q and ⋆ being order-preserving in its
second coordinate; the second inequality is obtained by applying the right-to-
left direction of (5) to the inequality [q]m′ ≤ [q]m′; the last inequality holds
by assumption. The soundness of DyR follows likewise from the left-to-right
direction of (5).
This calculus is shown to be both sound and complete w.r.t. this algebraic se-
mantics. The setting illustrated above is powerful enough that sufficiently many
epistemic actions can be encoded in it to support the formalisation of various
variants of the Muddy Children Puzzle in which children might be cheating.
However, cut-elimination for this system has not been proven.
In [19], a similar framework is presented which exploits the same basic ideas,
and results in a system with more explicit proof-theoretic performances and
which is shown to be cut-free. However, like its previous version, this system
focuses on a logic semantically arising from an algebraic setting which is vastly
more general than the usual relational setting. The issue about how it precisely
restricts to the usual setting, and hence how the usual DEL-type logics can be
captured within this more general calculus, is left largely implicit. The semantic
setting of [11], where propositions are interpreted as elements of a right module
M on a quantale Q, specialises in [19] to a setting in which M = (A, {2A,A :
A ∈ Ag}), where A is a Heyting algebra and, for every agent A, the modalities
2A and A are adjoint to each other. Notice that 3A, which in the classical
case is defined as ¬2A¬, cannot be expressed any more in this way, and needs
to be added as a primitive connective, which has not been done in [19].
As mentioned before, the design of this calculus gives a more explicit ac-
count than its previous version to certain technical aspects which come from
the semantic setting; for instance, the semantic setting motivating both papers
features two domains of interpretation (one for the actions and one for the pro-
positions), which are intended to give rise to two consequence relations which
are to be treated on a par and then made to interact. In [11], the calculus ma-
nipulates sequents which are made of heterogeneous components. For instance,
in action-sequents Γ ⊢Q q, the precedent Γ is a sequence in which both actions
and agents may occur. Since Γ is to be semantically interpreted as an element
of Q, they need to resort to a rather clumsy technical solution which consists
in interpreting, e.g. the sequence (q, A, q′) as the element fQA (q) · q
′. In [19],
the calculus is given in a deep-inference format; namely, rules of this calculus
make it possible to manipulate formulas inside a given context. This more ex-
plicit bookkeeping makes it possible to prove the cut-elimination, following the
original Gentzen strategy. However, the presence of two different consequence
relations and the need to account for their interaction calls for the development
of an extensive theory-of-contexts, in which no less than five different types of
contexts need to be introduced. This also causes a proliferation of rules, since
the possibility of performing some inferences depends on the type of context
under which they are to be performed.
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Calculi for updates. In [6], a formal framework accounting for dynamic
revisions or updates is introduced, in which the revisions/updates are formal-
ized using the turnstile symbol. This framework has aspects similar to Hoare
logic: indeed, it manipulates sequent-type structures of the form φ, φ′ |= φ′′,
such that φ and φ′′ are formulas of proposition-type, and φ′ is a formula of
event-type. This formalism has also common aspects to [11] and [19]: indeed,
both proposition-type and event-type (i.e. action-type) formulas allow epistemic
modalities for each agent, respectively accounting for the agent’s epistemic un-
certainty about the world and about the actions actually taking place.
In [8] and [7], three formal calculi are introduced, manipulating the syn-
tactic structures above. Given that the turnstile encodes the update rather
than a consequence relation or entailment, the syntactic structures above are
not sequents in a proper sense. Rather than sequent calculi, these calculi should
be rather regarded as being of natural deduction-type. As such, the design of
these calculi presents many issues from a proof-theoretic semantic viewpoint;
to mention only one, multiple connectives are introduced at the same time, for
instance in the following rule:
φ, φ′ ⊢ φ′′
R5.
〈Bj〉(φ ∧ Pre(p′)), 〈Bj〉(φ′ ∧ p′) ⊢ 〈Bj〉φ′′
These calculi are shown to be sound and complete w.r.t. three semantic
consequence relations, respectively.
4.4 First attempt at a display calculus for EAK
In [30], a display-style sequent calculus D.EAK has been introduced, which is
sound with respect to the final coalgebra semantics (cf. section 5), and complete
w.r.t. EAK, of which it is a conservative extension. Moreover, Gentzen-style cut
elimination holds for D.EAK. Finally, this system is defined independently of
the relational semantics of EAK, and therefore is suitable for a fine-grained
proof-theoretic semantic analysis.
Here below, we are not going to report on it in detail, but we limit ourselves to
mention the structural rules which capture the specific features of EAK:
Structural Rules with Side Conditions
Pre(α) ; {α}A ⊢ X
reduceL
{α}A ⊢ X
X ⊢ Pre(α) > {α}A
reduceR
X ⊢ {α}A
Pre(α) ; {α}{a}X ⊢ Y
swap-inL
Pre(α) ; {a}{β}αaβ X ⊢ Y
Y ⊢ Pre(α) > {α}{a}X
swap-inR
Y ⊢ Pre(α) > {a}{β}αaβ X
(
Pre(α) ; {a}{β}X ⊢ Y | αaβ
)
swap-outL
Pre(α) ; {α}{a}X ⊢ ;
(
Y | αaβ
)
(
Y ⊢ Pre(α) > {a}{β}X | αaβ
)
swap-outR
;
(
Y | αaβ
)
⊢ Pre(α) > {α}{a}X
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The swap-out rules do not have a fixed arity; they have as many premises as there
are actions β such that αaβ. In the conclusion, the symbol ;
(
Y | αaβ
)
refers
to a string (· · · (Y ;Y ) ; · · · ;Y ) with n occurrences of Y , where n = |{β | αaβ}|.
Operational Rules with Side Conditions
Pre(α) ; {α}A ⊢ X
reverseL
Pre(α) ; [α]A ⊢ X
X ⊢ Pre(α) > {α}A
reverseR
X ⊢ Pre(α) > 〈α〉A
The main issues of D.EAK from the point of view of Wansing’s criteria
are linked with the presence of the formula Pre(α): namely, the swap-in and
swap-out rules violate the principle that all parametric variables should occur
unrestricted. Indeed, the occurrences of the formula Pre(α) in these rules is
easily seen to be parametric, since Pre(α) occurs both in the premises and in
the conclusion. Since Pre(α) is (the metalinguistic abbreviation of) a formula,
it is a structure of a very restricted shape. As to the swap-out rules, it is not
difficult to see, e.g. semantically (cf. [35, Definition 4.2.]), that the occurrences
of Pre(α) can be removed both in the premises and in the conclusion without
affecting either the soundness of the rule or the proof power of the system; this
entirely remedies the problem. Likewise, as to swap-in, it is not difficult to
see that the occurrences of Pre(α) can be removed in the premises, but not in
the conclusion. However, even modified in this way, the swap-in rules would
not be satisfactory. Indeed, the new form of swap-in would introduce Pre(α)
in the conclusion. Since Pre(α) is a metalinguistic abbreviation of a formula
which as such has no other specific restrictions, the occurrence of Pre(α) in the
conclusion of swap-in must also be regarded as parametric. However, we still
would not be able to substitute arbitrary structures for it, which is the source of
the problem. This problem would be solved if Pre(α) could be expressed, as a
structure, purely in terms of the parameter α and structural constants (but no
structural variables). If this was the case, swap-in would encode the relations
between all these logical constants, and all the occurring structural variables
would be unrestricted.
Secondly, the rules reduce violate condition C1: indeed, in each of them, a
formula in the premisses, namely Pre(α), is not a subformula of any formula
occurring in the conclusion. Together with the cut-elimination, condition C1
guarantees the subformula property (cf. [15, Theorem 4.3]), but is not itself
essential for the cut-elimination, and indeed, cut-elimination has been proven
for D.EAK (albeit not à la Belnap). The specific way in which reduce violates C1
is also not a very serious one. Indeed, if the formula Pre(α) could be expressed
in a structural way, this violation would disappear.
This solution cannot be implemented in D.EAK because the language of
D.EAK does not have enough expressivity to talk about Pre(α) in any other
way than as an arbitrary formula, which needs to be introduced via weakening
or via identity (if atomic). Being able to account for Pre(α) in a satisfactory
way from a proof-theoretic semantic perspective would require being able to
state rules which, for any α, would introduce Pre(α) specifically, thus capturing
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its proof-theoretic meaning. Thus, by having structural and operational rules
for Pre(α), we would solve many problems in one stroke: on the one hand,
we would gain the practical advantage of achieving the satisfaction of C1, thus
guaranteeing the subformula property; on the other hand, and more importantly,
from a methodological perspective, we would be able to have a setting in which
the occurrences of Pre(α) are not to be regarded as side formulas, but rather,
they would occur as structures, on a par with all the other structures they would
be interacting with.
Finally, the only operational rules violating Wansing’s separation principle
(cf. subsection 2.3) are the reverse rules:
Pre(α); {α}A ⊢ X
revL
Pre(α); [α]A ⊢ X
X ⊢ Pre(α) > {α}A
revR
X ⊢ Pre(α) > 〈α〉A
Here again, the problem comes from the fact that the language is not expressive
enough to capture the principles encoded in the rules above at a purely structural
level. In this operational formulation, these rules are to participate, in our view
improperly, in the proof-theoretic meaning of the connectives [α] and 〈α〉. Thus,
it would be desirable that the rules above could be either derived, so that they
disappear altogether, or alternatively, be reformulated as structural rules.
5 Final coalgebra semantics of dynamic logics
In order to provide a justification for the soundness of the display postulates
involving the dynamic connectives, in [30] the final coalgebra was used as a
semantic environment for the calculus D.EAK. Specifically, the final coalgebra
was there used to show that D.EAK is sound, and conservatively extends EAK.
In the present section, we briefly review the needed preliminaries on the final
coalgebra, and then the interpretation of EAK-formulas in the final coalgebra,
which we will use in section 6.2 to show that D’.EAK is sound, and conservatively
extends EAK.9
5.1 The final coalgebra
The general notion of a coalgebra, as an arrow
W → FW
is given w.r.t. a functor F : C → C on an arbitrary category C, and much of the
theory of coalgebras is devoted to establishing results on coalgebras parametric
in that functor F . For example, important notions such as bisimilarity and
Hennessy-Milner logics can be given for arbitrary functors on the category of
sets (and many other concrete categories). But even if one is interested, as in
9This semantics specifically applies to the classical base. Analogous ideas can be developed
for weaker propositional bases, but in the present paper we do not pursue them further.
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our case here, only in one particular functor, the notion of a final coalgebra is
of value, as we are going to see.
Aczel [2] observed that coalgebras
W → PW
for the powerset functor P (which maps a set W to the set PW of subsets of
W ) are exactly Kripke frames. Indeed, a map W → PW equivalently encodes
a binary relation R on W . More importantly, the category theoretic notion of
a coalgebra morphism coincides with the notion of bounded (or p-) morphism
in modal logic, and the coalgebraic notion of bisimulation coincides with the
notion in modal logic. This observation generalises easily to Kripke models over
a set AtProp of atomic propositions and with multiple relations indexed by a set
of agents Ag, which are exactly coalgebras
W → (PW )Ag × 2AtProp.
As shown by [3], one can construct a ‘universal model’ Z by taking the disjoint
union of all coalgebras M and quotienting by bisimilarity. This coalgebra Z is
final, that is, for any coalgebra M there is exactly one morphism M → Z. The
property of finality characterises Z up to isomorphism.
Z may be a proper class. In [3], any functor F on sets is extended to
classes and it is shown that the extended functor always has a final coalgebra,
constructed as the bisimilarity collapse of the disjoint union of all coalgebras. In
[13], the same construction is recast in terms of an inaccessible cardinal, staying
inside the set-theoretic universe without using classes. In [5] these results are
generalized from sets to other similar categories such as posets, and in [4], it is
shown that any functor F on classes is the extension of a functor F on sets.
Z classifies bisimilarity. The importance of the theorems above is not
merely the existence of the final coalgebra. Since all of these theorems involve
two functors, one on ‘large’ sets extending another one on ‘small’ sets, and
since one is interested in the notion of bisimilarity associated with the small
functor, the existence of a final coalgebra for the large functor is not in itself
the result one is interested in. But it is a fact, expressed for example as the
small subcoalgebra lemma in [3], that in all of the constructions above, the final
coalgebra for the large functor classifies the notion of bisimilarity associated
with the small functor. In other words, passing from small to large does not
extend—up to bisimilarity—the range of available models.
Frame conditions on Z. Often, one is interested in Kripke models satisfying
additional frame conditions such as reflexivity, transitivity, equivalence, etc. A
sufficient condition for the existence of a final coalgebra under such additional
conditions is that these conditions can be formulated by modal axioms or rules,
see [34, 33] for details.
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5.2 Final coalgebra semantics of modal logic
Summing up the discussion in the previous subsection, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between subsets of the final coalgebra and unary predicates
invariant under bisimilarity. Therefore, whenever we know that A is a formula
invariant under bisimilarity, we may declare the subset [[A]]
Z
= {z ∈ Z | Z, z 
A} of the final coalgebra as the (final) semantics of A and recover [[A]]M ⊆ W
as
[[A]]
M
= f−1([[A]]
Z
), (10)
where f is the unique homomorphism
f : M→ Z
provided by the property of Z being final. Let us note that this approach is
quite general: it only needs a notion of bisimilarity tied to the morphisms of
some category (see [37] for a general definition) and a notion of modal formula
whose semantics is invariant under this notion of bisimilarity.
Final coalgebra semantics of dynamic modalities. Dynamic logics add
to Kripke semantics a facility for updating the Kripke model interpreting a
formula. Typically, despite seemingly increasing the expressiveness of modal
logic, such dynamic logics also enjoy bisimulation invariance and can therefore
be interpreted in the final coalgebra.
Whereas the Kripke semantics of an action α is a relation between pointed
models, the final coalgebra semantics of an action α is simply a relation on
the carrier Z of the final coalgebra Z. The precise relationship between Kripke
semantics and final coalgebra semantics of actions is as follows. Let us write
z αZ z
′
to express that the two points z, z′ of the final coalgebra are related by α,
formalising that in z the action α can happen and has z′ as a successor. Then
z αZ z
′ iff there are pointed models (M, w) and (M′, w′) related by the action α
such that the unique morphisms M→ Z and M′ → Z map w to z and w′ to z′.
Specific desiderata for epistemic actions. The specific feature of epi-
stemic actions versus arbitrary actions is that epistemic actions do not change
the factual states of affairs. Semantically, this motivates the additional require-
ment that if αZ ⊆ Z × Z is the interpretation of an epistemic action α and
z, z′ ∈ Z are such that zαZz
′, then
{p ∈ AtProp | z  p} = {p ∈ AtProp | z′  p}.
Adjoints of dynamic modalities. To semantically justify the full display
property of display calculi for dynamic logics, adjoints need to be available not
only for the standard modalities, but also for the dynamic ones. Now, it is well
known that modalities induced by a relation come in adjoint pairs. Let us recall
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Proposition 2. Every relation R ⊆ X × Y gives rise to the modal operators
〈R〉, [R] : PY → PX and 〈R◦〉, [R◦] : PX → PY
defined as follows: for every V ⊆ X and every U ⊆ Y ,
〈R〉U = {x ∈ X | ∃y . xRy & y ∈ U} [R]U = {x ∈ X | ∀y . xRy ⇒ y ∈ U}
〈R◦〉V = {y ∈ Y | ∃x . xRy & x ∈ V } [R◦]V = {y ∈ Y | ∀x . xRy ⇒ x ∈ V }.
These operators come in adjoint pairs:
〈R〉U ⊆ V iff U ⊆ [R◦]V (11)
〈R◦〉V ⊆ U iff V ⊆ [R]U. (12)
In order to apply this proposition to dynamic modalities, we need to consider
the relation corresponding to an action α. Kripke semantics suggests to consider
α as a relation on all pointed Kripke models (M, w), but this would introduce
a two-tiered semantics: with the semantics of an ordinary modality given by a
relation on the carrier of a model M and the semantics of a dynamic modality
given by a relation on the set of all pointed models (M, w). In the final coalgebra
semantics all relations are relations on the final coalgebra Z and we can directly
apply the above proposition to both static and dynamic modalities (with the X
and Y of the proposition being the carrier of the final coalgebra).
Soundness of the display postulates. Let us expand on how to interpret
display-type structures and sequents in the final coalgebra. Structures will be
translated into formulas, and formulas will be interpreted as subsets of the final
coalgebra. In order to translate structures as formulas, structural connectives
need to be translated as logical connectives; to this effect, structural connectives
are associated with pairs of logical connectives and any given occurrence of a
structural connective is translated as one or the other, according to which side
of the sequent the given occurrence can be displayed on as main connective, as
reported in Table 1. These logical connectives in turn are interpreted in the
final coalgebra in the standard way. For example,
[[〈α〉A]]
Z
= 〈αZ〉[[A]]Z [[[α]A]]Z = [αZ][[A]]Z
[[ 〈α
〉 A]]
Z
= 〈αZ
◦〉[[A]]
Z
[[ [α
]
A]]
Z
= [αZ
◦][[A]]
Z
where the notation on the right-hand sides refers to the one defined in Propos-
ition 2.
Sequents A ⊢ B will be interpreted as inclusions [[A]]Z ⊆ [[B]]Z ; rules (Ai ⊢ Bi |
i ∈ I)/C ⊢ D will be interpreted as implications of the form “if [[Ai]]Z ⊆ [[Bi]]Z
for every i ∈ I, then [[C]]Z ⊆ [[D]]Z ”. As a direct consequence of the adjunctions
(11) and (12), the following display postulates are sound under the interpretation
above.
{α}X ⊢ Y {α}
{
α}
X ⊢ {
α} Y
X ⊢ {α}Y
{
α}
{α}
{
α} X ⊢ Y
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Structural if in precedent if in succedent
connective position position
I ⊤ ⊥
A ;B A ∧B A ∨B
A > B A
∧
B A→ B
{a}A 〈a〉A [a]A
{
a
} A 〈a
〉 A [a
]
A
{α}A 〈α〉A [α]A
{
α} A 〈α
〉 A [α
]
A
Table 1: Translation of structural connectives into logical connectives
✚✙
✛✘
u
p, r
⑦
✚✙
✛✘
u
p, r ✚✙
✛✘
v
q
q
✐
⑦ ❂
Figure 1: The models Mα and M.
Remark. On the other hand, standard Kripke models are not in general closed
under (the interpretations of) α and α◦. As a direct consequence of this fact,
we can show that e.g. the display postulate
({α}
{
α}
)
is not sound if we interpret it
in a Kripke model M for any interpretation of formulas of the form [α
]
B in M.
Indeed, consider the model M represented on the right-hand side of the Figure 1
and let the action α be so that updating (M, u) gives the model Mα depicted on
the left-hand side of the figure. In other words, α is the public announcement
(cf. [12]) of the atomic proposition r. Further, let A := [a]p and B := q, where
a is the agent whose equivalence relation is depicted by the arrows of the figure.
Let i : Mα →֒ M be the submodel injection map. Clearly, [[[a]p]]
M
= ∅, which
implies that the inclusion [[A]]
M
⊆ [[ [α
]
B]]
M
trivially holds for any interpretation
of [α
]
B in M; however, i[[[[a]p]]
Mα
] = {u}, hence [[〈α〉[a]p]]
M
= V (r) ∩ {u} =
{u} 6⊆ {v} = [[q]]
M
, which falsifies the inclusion [[〈α〉A]]
M
⊆ [[B]]
M
. This proves
our claim.
Related work. Final coalgebra semantics for dynamic logics was employed
by Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [27], Gerbrandy [26], Baltag [10], and Cîrstea
and Sadrzadeh [17]. Adjoints of dynamic modalities with Kripke semantics
were considered in Baltag, Coecke, Sadrzadeh [11]. To guarantee the soundness
of the rules involving the adjoints, they have to close the Kripke models under
actions, which amounts, from our point of view, to generating a subcoalgebra
of the final coalgebra closed under actions. The arguments reported here in
favour of the final coalgebra semantics for treating dynamic modalities with
their adjoints are taken from [30].
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6 Proof-Theoretic Semantics for EAK
In the present section, we introduce the calculus D’.EAK for the logic EAK,
which is a revised and improved version of the calculus D.EAK discussed in sec-
tion 4.4. We argue that D’.EAK satisfies the requirements discussed in section
2.3. On the basis of this, we propose D’.EAK as an adequate calculus from the
viewpoint of proof-theoretic semantics. We also verify that D’.EAK is a quasi
proper display calculus (cf. definition 2), and hence its cut elimination theorem
follows from theorem 1.
6.1 The calculus D’.EAK
As is typical of display calculi, D’.EAK manipulates sequents of type X ⊢ Y ,
where X and Y are structures, i.e. syntactic objects inductively built from
formulas using structural connectives, or proxies. Every proxy is typically asso-
ciated with two logical (operational) connectives, and is interpreted contextually
as one or the other of the two, depending on whether it occurs in precedent or
in succedent position (cf. definition 1). The design of D’.EAK follows Došen’s
principle (cf. section 2.3); consequently, D’.EAK is modular along many dimen-
sions. For instance, the space of the versions of EAK on nonclassical bases, down
to e.g. the Lambek calculus, can be captured by suitably removing structural
rules. Moreover, also w.r.t. static modal logic, the space of properly displayable
normal modal logics (cf. [32]) can be reconstructed by adding or removing struc-
tural rules in a suitable way. Finally, different types of interaction between the
dynamic and the epistemic modalities can be captured by changing the relative
structural rules.
In order to highlight this modularity, we will present the system piecewise.
First we give rules for the propositional base, divided into structural rules and
operational rules; then we do the same for the static modal operators; finally,
we introduce the rules for the dynamic modalities.
In the table below, we give an overview of the logical connectives of the
propositional base and their proxies.
Structural symbols < > ; I
Operational symbols ∧ ←
∧
→ ∧ ∨ ⊤ ⊥
The table below contains the structural rules for the propositional base:
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Structural Rules
Id
p ⊢ p
X ⊢ A A ⊢ Y
Cut
X ⊢ Y
X ⊢ Y
I1L
I ⊢ Y < X
X ⊢ Y
I1R
X < Y ⊢ I
X ⊢ Y
I2L
I ⊢ X > Y
X ⊢ Y
I2R
Y > X ⊢ I
I ⊢ X
IWL
Y ⊢ X
X ⊢ I
IWR
X ⊢ Y
X ⊢ Z
W 1L Y ⊢ Z < X
X ⊢ Z
W 1RX < Z ⊢ Y
X ⊢ Z
W 2L Y ⊢ X > Z
X ⊢ Z
W 2RZ > X ⊢ Y
X ;X ⊢ Y
CL
X ⊢ Y
Y ⊢ X ;X
CR
Y ⊢ X
Y ;X ⊢ Z
EL
X ;Y ⊢ Z
Z ⊢ X ;Y
ER
Z ⊢ Y ;X
X ; (Y ;Z) ⊢ W
AL
(X ;Y ) ;Z ⊢ W
W ⊢ (Z ;Y ) ;X
AR
W ⊢ Z ; (Y ;X)
The top-to-bottom direction of each I-rule is a special case of the corres-
ponding weakening rule. However, we state them all the same for the sake of
modularity, since they might still be part of a calculus for a substructural logic
without weakening. The weakening rules are not given in the usual shape; the
present version has the advantage that the new structure is introduced in isola-
tion; nevertheless, the standard version is derivable from the display postulates,
as shown below:
X ⊢ Z
Y ⊢ Z < X
Y ;X ⊢ Z
Having both versions of weakening as primitive rules is useful for reducing the
size of derivations. In the following table, we include the display postulates
linking the structural connective ; with > and <:
Display Postulates
X ;Y ⊢ Z
(; , <)
X ⊢ Z < Y
Z ⊢ X;Y
(<, ; )
Z < Y ⊢ X
X ;Y ⊢ Z
(; , >)
Y ⊢ X > Z
Z ⊢ X ;Y
(>, ; )
X > Z ⊢ Y
In the current presentation, more connectives with their associated rules are ac-
counted for than in [30]. The additional rules can be proved to be derivable from
the remaining ones in the presence of the rules exchange EL and ER. Likewise,
as is well known, by dispensing with contraction, weakening and associativity,
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an even wider array of connectives would ensue (for instance, dispensing with
weakening and contraction would separate the additive and the multiplicative
versions of each connective, etc.). We are not going to expand on these well
known ideas any further, but only point out that, in the context of the whole
system that we are going to introduce below, this would give a modular account
of different versions of EAK with different substructural logics as propositional
base. The calculus introduced here is amenable to this line of investigation. A
natural question in this respect would be to relate these ensuing proof formal-
isms with the semantic settings of [11].
In line with this modular perspective on the propositional base for EAK,
the classical base is obtained by adding the so-called Grishin rules (following
e.g. [29]), encoding validities which are classical but not intuitionistic:
Grishin rules
X > (Y ;Z) ⊢ W
GriL
(X > Y );Z ⊢ W
W ⊢ X > (Y ;Z)
GriR
W ⊢ (X > Y );Z
This modular treatment can be regarded as an application of Došen’s principle:
calculi for versions of EAK with stronger and stronger propositional bases are
obtained by progressively adding structural rules, but keeping the same oper-
ational rules. As a consequence, cut elimination for the different versions will
follow immediately from the cut-elimination metatheorem without having to
verify condition C8 again.
The following table shows the operational rules for the propositional base:
Operational Rules
⊥L
⊥ ⊢ I
X ⊢ I
⊥R
X ⊢ ⊥
I ⊢ X
⊤L
⊤ ⊢ X
⊤R
I ⊢ ⊤
A ;B ⊢ Z
∧L
A ∧ B ⊢ Z
X ⊢ A Y ⊢ B
∧R
X ;Y ⊢ A ∧ B
A ⊢ X B ⊢ Y
∨L
A ∨B ⊢ X ;Y
Z ⊢ A ;B
∨R
Z ⊢ A ∨ B
B ⊢ Y X ⊢ A←L
B ← A ⊢ Y < X
Z ⊢ B < A
←R
Z ⊢ B ← A
B < A ⊢ Z
∧ L
B ∧A ⊢ Z
Y ⊢ B A ⊢ X
∧ R
Y < X ⊢ B ∧A
X ⊢ A B ⊢ Y→L
A→ B ⊢ X > Y
Z ⊢ A > B
→R
Z ⊢ A→ B
A > B ⊢ Z∧
L
A
∧
B ⊢ Z
A ⊢ X Y ⊢ B ∧
R
X > Y ⊢ A
∧
B
As is well known, in the presence of exchange, the connectives ← and ∧ are
identified with → and
∧
, respectively. Notice that the rules ⊥R and ⊤L are
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derivable in the presence of weakening and the I-rules. An example of such a
derivation is given below:
X ⊢ I
I > X ⊢ ⊥
X ⊢ I ;⊥
X < ⊥ ⊢ I
X ⊢ ⊥
The rules for the normal epistemic modalities can be added to the system
above or to any of its variants discussed early on. To this end, the language is
now expanded with two contextual proxies and four operational connectives for
every agent a, as follows:
Structural symbols {a} {
a
}
Operational symbols 〈a〉 [a ] 〈a
〉
[a
]
The proxies {a} and {
a
} are translated into diamond-type modalities when oc-
curring in precedent position and into box-type modalities when occurring in
succedent position. The structural rules, the display postulates, and the opera-
tional rules for the static modalities are respectively given in the following three
tables:
Structural Rules
I ⊢ X
nec
ep
L {a} I ⊢ X
X ⊢ I
nec
ep
R
X ⊢ {a} I
I ⊢ XepnecL
{
a
}
I ⊢ X
X ⊢ I epnecR
X ⊢
{
a
}
I
{a}Y > {a}Z ⊢ X
FS
ep
L {a}(Y > Z) ⊢ X
Y ⊢ {a}X > {a}Z
FS
ep
R
Y ⊢ {a}(X > Z)
{a}X ; {a}Y ⊢ Z
mon
ep
L {a}(X ;Y ) ⊢ Z
Z ⊢ {a}Y ; {a}X
mon
ep
R
Z ⊢ {a}(Y ;X)
{
a
}
Y >
{
a
}
X ⊢ Z
epFSL
{
a
} (Y > X) ⊢ Z
Y ⊢
{
a
}
X >
{
a
}
Z
epFSR
Y ⊢
{
a
} (X > Z)
{
a
}
X ;
{
a
}
Y ⊢ Z
epmonL
{
a
} (X ;Y ) ⊢ Z
Z ⊢
{
a
}
Y ;
{
a
}
X
epmonR
Z ⊢
{
a
} (Y ;X)
Notice that the mon-rules (the soundness of which is due to the monotonicity
of 〈α〉 and [α ]) are derivable from the FS-rules in the presence of non restricted
weakening and contraction.
The FS-rules above encode the following Fischer Servi-type axioms:
〈a〉A→ [a ]B ⊢ [a ](A→ B) 〈a
〉 A→ [a
]
B ⊢ [a
]
(A→ B)
〈a〉(A
∧
B) ⊢ [a ]A
∧
〈a〉B 〈a
〉 (A
∧
B) ⊢ [a
]
A
∧
〈a
〉 B.
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These axioms encode the link between 〈a〉 and [a] (and 〈a
〉 and [a
]
), namely,
that they are interpreted semantically using the same relation in a Kripke frame.
This link can be alternatively expressed by conjugation axioms, given below both
in the diamond- and in the box-version:
〈a〉A ∧B ⊢ 〈a〉(A ∧ 〈a
〉 B) 〈a
〉 A ∧B ⊢ 〈a
〉 (A ∧ 〈a〉B), (13)
[a]( [a
]
A ∨B) ⊢ (A ∨ [a]B) [a
]
([a]A ∨B) ⊢ (A ∨ [a
]
B), (14)
which in turn can be encoded in the following conjugation rules:
{a}(X ;
{
a
}
Y ) ⊢ Z
conj
{a}X ;Y ⊢ Z
X ⊢ {a}(Y ;
{
a
}
Z)
conj
X ⊢ {a}Y ;Z
{
a
} (X ; {a}Y ) ⊢ Z
conj
{
a
}
X ;Y ⊢ Z
X ⊢
{
a
} (Y ; {a}Z)
conj
X ⊢
{
a
}
Y ;Z
The conj-rules and the FS-rules can be shown to be interderivable thanks to
the following display postulates.
Display Postulates
{a}X ⊢ Y
({a},
{
a
} )
X ⊢
{
a
}
Y
X ⊢ {a}Y
(
{
a
}
, {a})
{
a
}
X ⊢ Y
Operational Rules
{a}A ⊢ X
〈a〉L
〈a〉A ⊢ X
X ⊢ A
〈a〉R
{a}X ⊢ 〈a〉A
A ⊢ X
[a]L
[a]A ⊢ {a}X
X ⊢ {a}A
[a]R
X ⊢ [a]A
{
a
}
A ⊢ X
〈a
〉
L
〈a
〉 A ⊢ X
X ⊢ A
〈a
〉
R
{
a
}
X ⊢ 〈a
〉
A
A ⊢ X
[a
]
L
[a
]
A ⊢
{
a
}
X
X ⊢
{
a
}
A
[a
]
R
X ⊢ [a
]
A
The rules presented so far are essentially adaptations of display calculi of Goré’s
[29]. Let us turn to the dynamic part of the calculus D’.EAK: the language is
now expanded by adding, for each action α:
- two contextual proxies, together with their four corresponding operational
unary connectives;
- one constant symbol and its corresponding structural proxy:
Structural symbols {α} {
α} Φα
Operational symbols 〈α〉 [α] 〈α
〉
[α
]
1α
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As in the previous version D.EAK, the proxies {α} and {
α} are translated into
diamond-type modalities when occurring in precedent position, and into box-
type modalities when occurring in succedent position. An important difference
between D.EAK and D’.EAK is the introduction of the structural and opera-
tional constants Φα and 1α; indeed, the additional expressivity they provide is
used to capture the proof-theoretic behaviour of the metalinguistic abbreviation
Pre(α) at the object-level. As was the case of Pre(α) in D.EAK, the rules below
will be such that the proxy Φα can occur only in precedent position. Hence, the
Φα can never be interpreted as anything else than 1α. However, a natural way
to extend D’.EAK would be to introduce an operational constant 0α, intuitively
standing for the postconditions of α for each action α, and dualize the relevant
rules so as to capture the behaviour of postconditions. In the present paper,
this expansion is not pursued any further.
The two tables below introduce the structural rules for the dynamic modal-
ities which are analogous to those for the static modalities given early on.
Structural Rules
I ⊢ X
nec
dyn
L {α} I ⊢ X
X ⊢ I
nec
dyn
RX ⊢ {α} I
I ⊢ XdynnecL
{
α} I ⊢ X
X ⊢ I dynnecR
X ⊢
{
α} I
{α}Y > {α}Z ⊢ X
FS
dyn
L {α}(Y > Z) ⊢ X
Y ⊢ {α}X > {α}Z
FS
dyn
RY ⊢ {α}(X > Z)
{α}X ; {α}Y ⊢ Z
mon
dyn
L {α}(X ;Y ) ⊢ Z
Z ⊢ {α}Y ; {α}X
mon
dyn
RZ ⊢ {α}(Y ;X)
{
α} Y >
{
α} X ⊢ Z
dynFSL
{
α} (Y > X) ⊢ Z
Y ⊢
{
α} X >
{
α} Z
dynFSR
Y ⊢
{
α} (X > Z)
{
α} X ;
{
α} Y ⊢ Z
dynmonL
{
α} (X ;Y ) ⊢ Z
Z ⊢
{
α} Y ;
{
α} X
dynmonR
Z ⊢
{
α} (Y ;X)
Analogous considerations as those made for the epistemic FS- and mon-rules
apply to the dynamic FS- and mon-rules above, also in relation to analogous
conjugation rules.
Display Postulates
{α}X ⊢ Y
({α},
{
α} )
X ⊢
{
α} Y
Y ⊢ {α}X
(
{
α} , {α})
{
α} Y ⊢ X
Next, we introduce the structural rules which are to capture the specific
behaviour of epistemic actions
Atom
atom
Γp ⊢ ∆p
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where Γ and ∆ are arbitrary finite sequences of the form (α1) . . . (αn), such that
each (αj) is of the form {αj} or of the form
{
αj
}
, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Intuitively, the
atom rules capture the requirement that epistemic actions do not change the
factual state of affairs (in the Hilbert-style presentation of EAK, this is encoded
in the axiom (1) in section 4.1).
Structural Rules for Epistemic Actions
X ⊢ Y
balance
{α}X ⊢ {α}Y
{α}
{
α} X ⊢ Y
compαL Φα;X ⊢ Y
X ⊢ {α}
{
α} Y
compαR
X ⊢ Φα > Y
Φα; {α}X ⊢ Y
reduce’L
{α}X ⊢ Y
Y ⊢ Φα > {α}X
reduce’R
Y ⊢ {α}X
{α}{a}X ⊢ Y
swap-in’L
Φα; {a}{β}αaβ X ⊢ Y
Y ⊢ {α}{a}X
swap-in’R
Y ⊢ Φα > {a}{β}αaβ X
(
{a}{β}X ⊢ Y | αaβ
)
swap-out’L
{α}{a}X ⊢ ;
(
Y | αaβ
)
(
Y ⊢ {a}{β}X | αaβ
)
swap-out’R
;
(
Y | αaβ
)
⊢ {α}{a}X
The swap-in’ rules are unary and should be read as follows: if the premise holds,
then the conclusion holds relative to any action β such that αaβ. The swap-
out’ rules do not have a fixed arity; they have as many premises10 as there are
actions β such that αaβ. In the conclusion, the symbol ;
(
Y | αaβ
)
refers to
a string (· · · (Y ;Y ) ; · · · ;Y ) with n occurrences of Y , where n = |{β | αaβ}|.
The swap-in and swap-out rules encode the interaction between dynamic and
epistemic modalities as it is captured by the interaction axioms in the Hilbert
style presentation of EAK (cf. (4) in section 4.1 and similarly in section 4.2). The
reduce rules encode well-known EAK validities such as 〈α〉A→ (Pre(α)∧〈α〉A).
Finally, the operational rules for 〈α〉, [α], and 1α are given in the table below:
Operational Rules
{α}A ⊢ X
〈α〉L
〈α〉A ⊢ X
X ⊢ A
〈α〉R
{α}X ⊢ 〈α〉A
A ⊢ X
[α]L
[α]A ⊢ {α}X
X ⊢ {α}A
[α]R
X ⊢ [α]A
Φα ⊢ X
1αL
1α ⊢ X
1αR
Φα ⊢ 1α
6.2 Properties of D’.EAK
Soundness. The calculus D’.EAK can be readily shown to be sound with re-
spect to the final coalgebra semantics. The general procedure has been outlined
10The swap-out rule could indeed be infinitary if action structures were allowed to be infinite,
which in the present setting, as in [12], is not the case.
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in section 5. The soundness of most of the rules of D’.EAK can be shown en-
tirely analogously to the soundness of the corresponding rules in D.EAK, which
is outlined in [30].
As for rules not involving {
α} , we will rely on the following observation, which
is based on the invariance of EAK-formulas under bisimulation (cf. Section 4.1):
Lemma 3. The following are equivalent for all EAK-formulas A and B:
(1) [[A]]Z ⊆ [[B]]Z ;
(2) [[A]]M ⊆ [[B]]M for every model M .
Proof. The direction from (2) to (1) is clear; conversely, fix a model M , and let
f : M → Z be the unique arrow; then (1) immediately implies that [[A]]M =
f−1([[A]]Z) ⊆ f
−1([[B]]Z) = [[B]]M .
In the light of the lemma above, and using the translations provided in Table
1, the soundness of unary rules A ⊢ B/C ⊢ D not involving {
α} , such as balance,
〈α〉R and [α]L, can be straightforwardly checked as implications of the form “if
[[A]]M ⊆ [[B]]M on every model M , then [[C]]M ⊆ [[D]]M on every model M ”. As
an example, let us check the soundness of balance: Let A,B be EAK-formulas
such that [[A]]M ⊆ [[B]]M on every model M . Let us fix a model M , and show
that [[〈α〉A]]M ⊆ [[[α]B]]M . As discussed in [36, Subsection 4.2], the following
identities hold in any standard model:
[[〈α〉A]]M = [[Pre(α)]]M ∩ ι
−1
k [i[[[A]]Mα ]], (15)
[[[α]A]]M = [[Pre(α)]]M ⇒ ι
−1
k [i[[[A]]Mα ]], (16)
where the map i : Mα →
∐
αM is the submodel embedding, and ιk : M →∐
αM is the embedding of M into its k-colored copy. Letting g(−) := ι
−1
k [i[−]],
we need to show that
[[Pre(α)]]M ∩ g([[A]]Mα) ⊆ [[Pre(α)]]M ⇒ g([[B]]Mα).
This is a direct consequence of the Heyting-valid implication “if b ≤ c then
a ∧ b ≤ a → c”, the monotonicity of g, and the assumption that [[A]]M ⊆ [[B]]M
holds on every model, hence on Mα.
Actually, for all rules (Ai ⊢ Bi | i ∈ I)/C ⊢ D not involving {
α} except
balance, 〈α〉R and [α]L, stronger soundness statements can be proven of the form
“for every model M , if [[Ai]]M ⊆ [[Bi]]M for every i ∈ I, then [[C]]M ⊆ [[D]]M ”
(this amounts to the soundness w.r.t. the standard semantics). This is the case
for all display postulates not involving {
α} , the soundness of which boils down
to the well known adjunction conditions holding in every model M . As to the
remaining rules not involving {
α} , thanks to the following general principle of
indirect (in)equality, the stronger soundness condition above boils down to the
verification of inclusions which interpret validities of IEAK [36], and hence, a
fortiori, of EAK. Same arguments hold for the Grishin rules, except that their
soundness boils down to classical but not intuitionistic validities.
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Lemma 4. (Principle of indirect inequality) Tfae for any preorder P and
all a, b ∈ P :
(1) a ≤ b;
(2) x ≤ a implies x ≤ b for every x ∈ P ;
(3) b ≤ y implies a ≤ y for every y ∈ P .
As an example, let us verify s-outL: fix a modelM , fix EAK-formulas A and
B, and assume that for every action β, if αaβ then [[〈a〉〈β〉A]]M ⊆ [[B]]M , i.e.,
that
⋃
{[[〈a〉〈β〉A]]M | αaβ} ⊆ [[B]]M ; we need to show that [[〈α〉〈a〉A]]M ⊆ [[B]]M .
By the principle of indirect inequality, it is enough to show that [[〈α〉〈a〉A]]M ⊆⋃
{[[〈a〉〈β〉A]]M | αaβ}. Indeed, since axiom (4) is valid on any model, we have:
[[〈α〉〈a〉A]]M ⊆ [[Pre(α)]]M ∩
⋃
{[[〈a〉〈β〉A]]M | αaβ} ⊆
⋃
{[[〈a〉〈β〉A]]M | αaβ}.
The soundness of the operational rules of 1α is immediate; the soundness of
atom can be proven directly on the final coalgebra by induction on the length
of Γ and ∆ using the fact, mentioned on page 30, that epistemic actions do not
change the valuations of atomic formulae. For instance, as to the base case of
this induction, let us argue for the soundness of {
α} p ⊢ p and p ⊢ {
α} p: indeed,
let αZ ⊆ Z × Z be the interpretation of the epistemic action α on the final
coalgebra, then the left-hand side of the atom-sequent above is interpreted as the
set αZ [[[p]]Z ]. Because of the assumption on αZ mentioned above it immediately
follows that αZ [[[p]]Z ] ⊆ [[p]]Z , and αZ [[[p]]
c
Z ] ⊆ [[p]]
c
Z . The former inclusion gives
the soundness of {
α} p ⊢ p, while the latter is equivalent to [[p]]Z ⊆ (αZ [[[p]]
c
Z ])
c,
which gives the soundness of p ⊢ {
α} p.
The soundness of the comp rules is given in the appendix (cf. subsection
A.2).
Finally, the soundness of the rules which do involve {
α} remains to be shown.
The soundness of the display postulates immediately follows from Proposition 2.
As an example, let us verify the soundness of dynFSL: translating the structures
into formulas, it boils down to verifying that, for all EAK-formulas A,B and C,
if [[ [α
]
A]]Z
∧
[[ 〈α
〉 B]]Z ⊆ [[C]]Z , then [[ 〈α
〉 (A
∧
B)]]Z ⊆ [[C]]Z . By applying the
appropriate adjunction rules, the implication above is equivalent to the following
implication: if [[B]]Z ⊆ [[[α]( [α
]
A ∨ C)]]Z then [[B]]Z ⊆ [[A ∨ [α]C]]Z . By applying
the principle of indirect inequality, we are reduced to showing the inclusion
[[[α]( [α
]
A ∨C)]]Z ⊆ [[A ∨ [α]C]]Z ,
which is the soundness of the box-version of a conjugation condition (see the
shape of (14) for epistemic modalities), and is true in Z since [α
]
is interpreted
as [α◦].
Completeness and conservativity. The completeness of D’.EAK w.r.t. the
Hilbert presentation of EAK (cf. subsections 4.1 and 4.2) is achieved by showing
that the axioms of (the intuitionistic version of) EAK are derivable in D’.EAK.
These derivations are collected in subsection C.
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Again, as was the case for D.EAK, the fact that D’.EAK is a conservative
extension of EAK can be argued as follows: let A,B be EAK-formulas such
that A ⊢D′.EAK B, and let Z be the final coalgebra. By the soundness of
D’.EAK w.r.t. the Z, this implies that [[A]]Z ⊆ [[B]]Z , which, by the bisimulation
invariance of EAK (cf. [30, Lemma 1]), implies that [[A]]M ⊆ [[B]]M for every
Kripke modelM , which, by the completeness of EAK w.r.t. the standard Kripke
semantics, implies that A ⊢EAK B.
Adequacy of D’.EAK w.r.t. Wansing’s criteria. It is easy to see that the
calculus D’.EAK enjoys the display property (cf. Definition 1). Like its previous
version, D’.EAK is defined independently of the relational semantics of EAK,
and therefore is suitable for a fine-grained proof-theoretic semantic analysis. It
can be readily verified by inspection that all operational rules satisfy Wansing’s
criteria of separation, symmetry and explicitness (cf. subsection 2.3).
Moreover, a clear-cut division of labour has been achieved between the op-
erational rules, which are to encode the proof-theoretic meaning of the new
connectives, and the structural rules, which are to express the relations enter-
tained between the different connectives by way of their proxies.
Another important proof-theoretic feature of D’.EAK is modularity. As
discussed in subsection 6.1, by suitably removing structural rules for the pro-
positional base of D’.EAK, the substructural versions of EAK can be modularly
defined. Moreover, by adding structural rules corresponding to properly dis-
playable modal logics (cf. [32]), different assumptions can be captured on the
behaviour of the epistemic modalities.11
Notwithstanding the fact that the old reverse rules, offending segregation, are
derived rules in D’.EAK, still the system D’.EAK does not satisfy segregation.
However, the only rule in D’.EAK offending segregation is atom because one
of the two principal formulas in each atom axioms might not occur in display.
Even if the most rigid proof-theoretic semantic principle is not met, D’.EAK is a
quasi-proper display calculus, and hence it enjoys Belnap-style cut elimination,
as will be shown in the next subsection.
6.3 Belnap-style cut-elimination for D’.EAK
In the present subsection, we prove that D’.EAK is a quasi proper display
calculus (cf. Subsection 3.1), that is, the rules of D’.EAK satisfy conditions
C1, C2, C3, C4, C
′
5, C
′′
5 , C6, C7, C8. By Theorem 1, this is enough to establish
that the calculus enjoys the cut elimination and the subformula property.
The rules reverse are now derivable, and all the rules with the side condition
Pre(α) have been reformulated so as to either remove Pre(α) altogether, or to
replace it with its structural counterpart. This has been achieved by expanding
11Note that Balance, comp, reduce, swap-in and swap-out are the only specific structural
rules for epistemic actions; the monotonicity and Fischer-Servi rules respectively encode the
conditions that box and diamond are monotone and interpreted by means of the same relation;
the necessitation can be considered as a special case of atom and IW can be eliminated if,
e.g., ⊥ ⊢ 〈α〉⊥ and [α]⊤ ⊢ ⊤ are introduced as zeroary rules.
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the language so that the meta-linguistic abbreviation Pre(α) can be replaced by
an operational constant and its corresponding structural connective. Hence, it
can be readily verified that all rules are closed under simultaneous substitution of
arbitrary structures for congruent parameters, which satisfies conditions C6 and
C7. It is easy to see that the operational rules for 1α and the comp rules satisfy
the criteria C1–C7. The atom axioms can be readily seen to verify condition C
′′
5
as given in subsection 3.1.
Finally, as to condition C8, let us show the cases involving the new connective
1α. All the other cases are reported in appendix B.
Φα ⊢ 1α
..
. pi
Φα ⊢ X
1α ⊢ X
Φα ⊢ X  
.
.. pi
Φα ⊢ X
7 Conclusions and further directions
7.1 Conclusions
In the present paper, we provide an analysis, conducted adopting the view-
point of proof-theoretic semantics, of the state-of-the-art deductive systems for
dynamic epistemic logic, focusing mainly on Baltag-Moss-Solecki’s logic of epi-
stemic actions and knowledge (EAK). We start with an overview of the general
research agenda in proof-theoretic semantics, and then we focus on display cal-
culi, as a proof-theoretic paradigm which has been successful in accounting for
difficult logics, such as modal logics and substructural logics. We discuss the
requirements which a proof system should satisfy to provide adequate proof-
theoretic semantics to logical constants, and, as an original contribution, we in-
troduce the notion of quasi proper display calculus, and prove its corresponding
Belnap-style cut elimination metatheorem. We then evaluate the main existing
proof systems for PAL/EAK according to the previously discussed requirements.
As the second original contribution, we propose a revised version of one such
system, namely of the system D.EAK (cf. section 4.4), and we argue that our
revised system D’.EAK adequately meets the proof-theoretic semantic require-
ments for all the logical constants involved. We also show that D’.EAK is sound
w.r.t. the final coalgebra semantics, complete w.r.t. EAK, of which it is a con-
servative extension. These three facts together guarantee that D’.EAK exactly
captures EAK. Finally, we verify that D’.EAK is a quasi proper display calcu-
lus. Hence, the generalized metatheorem applies, and D’.EAK is thus shown to
enjoy Belnap-style cut elimination (which was not argued for in the case of the
original system D.EAK) and the subformula property. The main ingredient of
this revision is an expansion of the language of the original system, aimed at
achieving an independent proof-theoretic account of the preconditions Pre(α).
This account is independent both in the sense that it is given purely in terms of
the resources of D’.EAK, and in the sense that the metalinguistic abbreviation
Pre(α) is treated as a first-class citizen of the revised system. Indeed, Pre(α)
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is endowed with both an operational and a structural representation, both of
which well-behaving.
7.2 Further directions
Uniform proof-theoretic account for dynamic logics. The present
paper is part of a larger research program aimed at giving a uniform proof-
theoretic account to a wide class of logics which includes dynamic logics. In
[20] and [22], this treatment has been extended to monotone modal logics and,
respectively, to the full language of Propositional Dynamic Logic. Another
interesting case study is Parikh’s Game Logic [43], where the dynamic modalities
are non normal and the set of agents is endowed with algebraic structure, which
is treated in a paper [21] in preparation.
Multi-type display-style calculi. The metatheorem proven in the present
paper applies to a class of display calculi (the quasi-proper display calculi) which
generalize Wansing’s notion of proper display calculi by relaxing the property
of isolation. However, in both quasi proper and proper display calculi, rules are
required to be closed under simultaneous substitution of arbitrary structures
for congruent formulas. This requirement occurs in a weaker form in both the
original [15, Theorem 4.4] and in some of its subsequent versions [16, 45, 49].
Indeed, these metatheorems apply to display calculi admitting rules for which
the closure under substitution may be not arbitrary, but restricted to structures
satisfying certain conditions. This weaker requirement primarily concerns rules;
however, it is encoded in the notion of regular formula and asks every formula to
be regular. The condition given in terms of regular formulas is key to accounting
for important logics such as linear logic. On the other hand, it ingeniously relies
on very special features of the signature of linear logic, and hence it is of difficult
application outside that setting. We conjecture that logics such as linear logic
can be alternatively accounted for by display-type calculi all the rules of which
are closed under simultaneous substitution of arbitrary structures for parametric
operational terms (formulas). We conjecture that this is possible thanks to
the introduction of a suitable multi-type environment, in which every derivable
sequent/consecution is required to be type-uniform (i.e., both the antecedent and
the consequent of any sequent/consecution must belong to the same type). The
requirement formulated in terms of regular formulas would then be encoded
in the multi-type setting in terms of the condition that, in each given rule,
parametric constituents (of a given and unambiguously determined type) can
be uniformly replaced by structures which are arbitrary within that same type,
so as to obtain instances of the same rule. An example of such a multi-type
environment is introduced in [23]. The adaptation of the multi-type setting to
the case of linear logic is work in progress.
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A Special rules
A.1 Derived rules in D’.EAK
In the presence of the display postulates, the conj-rules are interderivable with
the Fischer Servi rules. Indeed, let us show that the following rules
{α}(X ;
{
α} Y ) ⊢ Z
conj
{α}X ;Y ⊢ Z
Y ⊢
{
α} X >
{
α} Z
FS
Y ⊢
{
α} (X > Z)
are interderivable:12
{α}(X ;
{
α} Y ) ⊢ Z
X ;
{
α} Y ⊢
{
α} Z
{
α} Y ;X ⊢
{
α} Z
X ⊢
{
α} Y >
{
α} Z
FS
X ⊢
{
α} (Y > Z)
{α}X ⊢ Y > Z
Y ; {α}X ⊢ Z
{α}X ;Y ⊢ Z
Y ⊢
{
α} X >
{
α} Z
{
α} X ;Y ⊢
{
α} Z
Y ;
{
α} X ⊢
{
α} Z
{α}(Y ;
{
α} X) ⊢ Z
conj
{α}Y ;X ⊢ Z
X ; {α}Y ⊢ Z
{α}Y ⊢ X > Z
Y ⊢
{
α} (X > Z)
Analogous derivations show that the pairs of rules in each row of the table below
are interderivable:
{
α} (X ; {α}Y ) ⊢ Z
conj
{
α} X ;Y ⊢ Z
Y ⊢ {α}X > {α}Z
FS
Y ⊢ {α}(X > Z)
X ⊢ {α}(Y ;
{
α} Z)
conj
X ⊢ {α}Y ;Z
{
α} Y >
{
α} X ⊢ Z
FS
{
α} (Y > X) ⊢ Z
X ⊢
{
α} (Y ; {α}Z)
conj
X ⊢
{
α} Y ;Z
{α}Y > {α}Z ⊢ X
FS
{α}(Y > Z) ⊢ X
Let us show that the rules “with side conditions” in D.EAK (cf. subsection 4.4)
can be derived from their corresponding rules in D’.EAK and the remaining
part of the calculus.
An important benefit of the revised system is that the operational rules reverse
(or more precisely their rewritings in the new notation), which were primitive
in the old system, are now derivable using the new rules for Φα and 1α and the
new reduce. This supports our intuition that the rules reverse do not participate
in the proof-theoretic meaning of the connectives 〈α〉 and [α].
12Note that we are using exchange, but this rule is not required if we add the corresponding
Fisher-Servi rule for the right-residuum of ‘;’ and the obvious conjugation rule with ‘X ; {α}Y ’
in a reversed order.
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Φα ⊢ 1α
1α ; {α}A ⊢ X
1α ⊢ X < {α}A
Φα ⊢ X < {α}A
Φα ; {α}A ⊢ X
{α}A ⊢ X
A ⊢
{
α} X
[α]A ⊢ {α}
{
α} X
comp
[α]A ⊢ Φα > X
Φα ; [α]A ⊢ X
[α]A ; Φα ⊢ X
Φα ⊢ [α]A > X
1α ⊢ [α]A > X
[α]A ; 1α ⊢ X
1α ; [α]A ⊢ X
Φα ⊢ 1α
X ⊢ 1α > {α}A
1α ;X ⊢ {α}A
1α ⊢ {α}A < X
Φα ⊢ {α}A < X
Φα ;X ⊢ {α}A
X ⊢ Φα > {α}A
reduce′
X ⊢ {α}A
{
α} X ⊢ A
{α}
{
α} X ⊢ 〈α〉A
comp
Φα ;X ⊢ 〈α〉A
X ; Φα ⊢ 〈α〉A
Φα ⊢ X > 〈α〉A
1α ⊢ X > 〈α〉A
X ; 1α ⊢ 〈α〉A
1α ;X ⊢ 〈α〉A
X ⊢ 1α > 〈α〉A
The old rules reduce are derivable as follows.
Φα ⊢ 1α
1α ; {α}A ⊢ X
1α ⊢ X < {α}A
Φα ⊢ X < {α}A
Φα ; {α}A ⊢ X
reduce′
{α}A ⊢ X
Φα ⊢ 1α
X ⊢ 1α > {α}A
1α ;X ⊢ {α}A
X ; 1α ⊢ {α}A
1α ⊢ X > {α}A
Φα ⊢ X > {α}A
X ; Φα ⊢ {α}A
Φα ;X ⊢ {α}A
X ⊢ Φα > {α}A
reduce′
X ⊢ {α}A
The old swap-in rules are derivable in the revised calculus from the new swap-in
rules as follows.
Φα ⊢ 1α
1α ; {α}{a}X ⊢ Y
1α ⊢ Y < {α}{a}X
Φα ⊢ Y < {α}{a}X
Φα ; {α}{a}X ⊢ Y
reduce′
{α}{a}X ⊢ Y
swap-in′
Φα ; {a}{β}αaβ X ⊢ Y
Φα ⊢ Y < {a}{β}αaβ X
1α ⊢ Y < {a}{β}αaβ X
1α ; {a}{β}αaβ X ⊢ Y
Φα ⊢ 1α
Y ⊢ 1α > {α}{a}X
1α;Y ⊢ {α}{a}X
1α ⊢ {α}{a}X < Y
Φα ⊢ {α}{a}X < Y
Φα ; Y ⊢ {α}{a}X
Y ⊢ Φα > {α}{a}X
reduce′
Y ⊢ {α}{a}X
swap-in′
Y ⊢ {α}{a}X
Y ⊢ Φα > {a}{β}αaβ X
The old swap-out rules (translated into D’.EAK) are derivable using the new
swap-out rules:
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Φα ⊢ 1α
1α ; {a}{β1}X ⊢ Y | αaβ1
1α ⊢ Y < {a}{β1}X | αaβ1
Φα ⊢ Y < {a}{β1}X | αaβ1
Φα ; {a}{β1}X ⊢ Y | αaβ1
reduce′
{a}{β1}X ⊢ Y | αaβ1
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Φα ⊢ 1α
1α ; {a}{βn}X ⊢ Y | αaβn
1α ⊢ Y < {a}{βn}X | αaβn
Φα ⊢ Y < {a}{βn}X | αaβn
Φα ; {a}{βn}X ⊢ Y | αaβn
reduce′
{a}{βn}X ⊢ Y | αaβn
swap-out′
{α}{a}X ⊢ ;
(
Y | αaβ
)
1α ⊢ {α}{a}X > ;
(
Y | αaβ
)
{α}{a}X; 1α ⊢ ;
(
Y | αaβ
)
1α; {α}{a}X ⊢ ;
(
Y | αaβ
)
Φα ⊢ 1α
Y ⊢ 1α > {a}{β1}X | αaβ1
1α ;Y ⊢ {a}{β1}X | αaβ1
1α ⊢ {a}{β1}X | αaβ1 < Y
Φα ⊢ {a}{β1}X | αaβ1 < Y
Φα ;Y ⊢ {a}{β1}X | αaβ1
Y ⊢ Φα > {a}{β1}X | αaβ1
reduce′
Y ⊢ {a}{β1}X | αaβ1
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Φα ⊢ 1α
Y ⊢ 1α > {a}{βn}X | αaβn
1α ;Y ⊢ {a}{βn}X | αaβn
1α ⊢ {a}{βn}X | αaβn < Y
Φα ⊢ {a}{βn}X | αaβn < Y
Φα ;Y ⊢ {a}{βn}X | αaβn
Y ⊢ Φα > {a}{βn}X | αaβn
reduce′
Y ⊢ {a}{βn}X | αaβn
swap-out′
;
(
Y | αaβ
)
⊢ {α}{a}X
1α ⊢ ;
(
Y | αaβ
)
> {α}{a}X
;
(
Y | αaβ
)
; 1α ⊢ {α}{a}X
;
(
Y | αaβ
)
; 1α ⊢ {α}{a}X
;
(
Y | αaβ
)
⊢ 1α > {α}{a}X
A.2 Soundness of comp rules in the final coalgebra
We address the reader to [30] for details on the final coalgebra semantics for
dynamic epistemic logic.
To prove the soundness of the rules above in the final coalgebra it suffices to
check that for every formula A,
[α][α−1][[A]]
Z
⊆ [[Pre(α) → A]]
Z
and [[Pre(α) ; A]]
Z
⊆ 〈α〉〈α−1〉[[A]]
Z
.
We will make use of the following general fact:
Fact 5. Let R be a binary relation on a set X and let R−1 be its converse.
Then,
[Dom(R)×Dom(R)] ∩∆X ⊆ R;R
−1,
where Dom(R) = {x ∈ X | xRy for some y ∈ X}, and ∆X = {(x, x) | x ∈ X}.
Proof. Straightforward.
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Fact 6. The following comp rules:
Y ⊢ {α} {
α} X
Y ⊢ Pre(α) > X
{α} {
α} X ⊢ Y
Pre(α) ;X ⊢ Y
are sound in the final coalgebra.
Proof.
〈α〉〈α−1〉[[A]]
Z
= α−1[α[[[A]]
Z
]]
= (α;α−1)[[[A]]
Z
]
⊇ S[[[A]]
Z
] Fact 5
= Dom(α) ∩ [[A]]
Z
= [[Pre(α) ; A]]
Z
,
[α][α−1][[A]]
Z
= (α−1[([α−1][[A]]
Z
)c])c
= (α−1[α[[[A]]
c
Z
]])c
= ((α;α−1)[[[A]]c
Z
])c
⊆ (S[[[A]]
c
Z
])c Fact 5
= (Dom(α) ∩ [[A]]
c
Z
])c
= Dom(α)c ∪ [[A]]
Z
= [[Pre(α)→ A]]
Z
,
where S = [Dom(R)×Dom(R)] ∩∆X .
B Cut elimination for D’.EAK
In the present section, we report on the remaining cases for the verification of
condition C8 for D’.EAK; these cases are needed already for the cut elimination
á la Gentzen for D.EAK, but do not appear in [30].
First we consider the atom rule (see page 38).
Γp ⊢ p p ⊢ ∆p
Γp ⊢ ∆p  Γp ⊢ ∆p
Now we treat the introductions of the connectives of the propositional base (we
also treat here the cases relative to the two additional arrows← and
∧
added
to our presentation of D.EAK):
I ⊢ ⊤
..
. pi
I ⊢ X
⊤ ⊢ X
I ⊢ X  
..
. pi
I ⊢ X
.
.. pi
X ⊢ I
X ⊢ ⊥ ⊥ ⊢ I
X ⊢ I  
..
. pi
X ⊢ I
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..
. pi1
X ⊢ A
..
. pi2
Y ⊢ B
X ;Y ⊢ A ∧ B
.
.. pi3
A ;B ⊢ Z
A ∧ B ⊢ Z
X ;Y ⊢ Z  
.
.. pi2
Y ⊢ B
.
.. pi1
X ⊢ A
..
. pi3
A ;B ⊢ Z
B ;A ⊢ Z
A ⊢ B > Z
X ⊢ B > Z
B ;X ⊢ Z
X ;B ⊢ Z
B ⊢ X > Z
Y ⊢ X > Z
X ;Y ⊢ Z
..
. pi3
Z ⊢ B ;A
Z ⊢ B ∨ A
.
.. pi1
B ⊢ Y
.
.. pi2
A ⊢ X
B ∨A ⊢ Y ;X
Z ⊢ Y ;X  
.
.. pi3
Z ⊢ B ;A
Z ⊢ A ;B
A > Z ⊢ B
..
. pi1
B ⊢ Y
A > Z ⊢ Y
Z ⊢ A ;Y
Z ⊢ Y ;A
Y > Z ⊢ A
..
. pi2
A ⊢ X
Y > Z ⊢ X
Z ⊢ Y ;X
.
.. pi1
Y ⊢ A > B
Y ⊢ A→ B
..
. pi2
X ⊢ A
..
. pi3
B ⊢ Z
A→ B ⊢ X > Z
Y ⊢ X > Z  
..
. pi2
X ⊢ A
.
.. pi1
Y ⊢ A > B
A ;Y ⊢ B
.
.. pi3
B ⊢ Z
A ; Y ⊢ Z
Y ;A ⊢ Z
A ⊢ Y > Z
X ⊢ Y > Z
Y ;X ⊢ Z
X ;Y ⊢ Z
Y ⊢ X > Z
..
. pi1
Y ⊢ B < A
Y ⊢ B ← A
.
.. pi2
B ⊢ Z
.
.. pi3
X ⊢ A
B ← A ⊢ Z < X
Y ⊢ Z < X  
.
.. pi2
X ⊢ A
..
. pi1
Y ⊢ B < A
Y ;A ⊢ B
..
. pi3
B ⊢ Z
Y ;A ⊢ Z
A;Y ⊢ Z
A ⊢ Z < Y
X ⊢ Z < Y
X;Y ⊢ Z
Y ;X ⊢ Z
Y ⊢ Z < X
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..
. pi2
A ⊢ Y
..
. pi3
Z ⊢ B
Y > Z ⊢ A
∧
B
.
.. pi1
A > B ⊢ X
A
∧
B ⊢ X
Y > Z ⊢ X  
..
. pi3
Z ⊢ B
.
.. pi1
A > B ⊢ X
B ⊢ A ;X
Z ⊢ A ;X
Z ⊢ X ;A
X > Z ⊢ A
.
.. pi2
A ⊢ Y
X > Z ⊢ Y
Z ⊢ X ; Y
Z ⊢ Y ;X
Y > Z ⊢ X
.
.. pi2
Y ⊢ B
.
.. pi3
A ⊢ Z
Y < Z ⊢ B ∧A
..
. pi1
B < A ⊢ X
B ∧ A ⊢ X
Y < Z ⊢ X  
.
.. pi3
Y ⊢ B
..
. pi1
B < A ⊢ X
B ⊢ X;A
Y ⊢ X;A
Y ⊢ A;X
Y < X ⊢ A
..
. pi2
A ⊢ Z
Y < X ⊢ Z
Y ⊢ Z ;X
Y ⊢ X ;Z
Y < Z ⊢ Y
Now we turn to the part of D’.EAK with static modalities. We omit the proofs
for 〈a
〉 and [a
]
, because they analogous to the transformations of 〈a〉 and [a].
.
.. pi1
X ⊢ A
{a}X ⊢ 〈a〉A
.
.. pi2
{a}A ⊢ Y
〈a〉A ⊢ Y
{a}X ⊢ Y  
.
.. pi1
X ⊢ A
..
. pi2
{a}A ⊢ Y
A ⊢
{
a
}
Y
X ⊢
{
a
}
Y
{a}X ⊢ Y
..
. pi1
X ⊢ {a}A
X ⊢ [a]A
..
. pi2
A ⊢ Y
[a]A ⊢ {a}Y
X ⊢ {a}Y  
.
.. pi1
X ⊢ {a}A
{
a
}
X ⊢ A
..
. pi2
A ⊢ Y
{
a
}
X ⊢ Y
X ⊢ {a}Y
The transformations of the dynamic modalities are analogous to the ones of
static modalities and, again, we only show them for 〈α〉 and [α].
.
.. pi1
X ⊢ A
{α}X ⊢ 〈α〉A
..
. pi2
{α}A ⊢ Y
〈α〉A ⊢ Y
{α}X ⊢ Y  
.
.. pi1
X ⊢ A
.
.. pi2
{α}A ⊢ Y
A ⊢
{
α} Y
X ⊢
{
α} Y
{α}X ⊢ Y
50
..
. pi1
X ⊢ {α}A
X ⊢ [α]A
..
. pi2
A ⊢ Y
[α]A ⊢ {α}Y
X ⊢ {α}Y  
.
.. pi1
X ⊢ {α}A
{
α} X ⊢ A
..
. pi2
A ⊢ Y
{
α} X ⊢ Y
X ⊢ {α}Y
C Completeness of D’.EAK
To prove, indirectly, the completeness of D’.EAK it is enough to show that all the
axioms and rules of IEAK are theorems and, respectively, derived or admissible
rules of D’.EAK. Below we show the derivations of the dynamic axioms and we
leave the remaining axioms and rules to the reader.
〈α〉 p ⊣⊢ 1α ∧ p
Φα ⊢ 1α {α} p ⊢ p
Φα ; {α} p ⊢ 1α ∧ p
reduce′
{α} p ⊢ 1α ∧ p
〈α〉 p ⊢ 1α ∧ p
{
α} p ⊢ p
{α}
{
α} p ⊢ 〈α〉 p
comp
Φα ; p ⊢ 〈α〉 p
Φα ⊢ 〈α〉 p < p
1α ⊢ 〈α〉 p < p
1α ; p ⊢ 〈α〉 p
1α ∧ p ⊢ 〈α〉 p
[α] p ⊣⊢ 1α → p
p ⊢
{
α} p
[α] p ⊢ {α}
{
α} p
comp
[α] p ⊢ Φα > p
Φα ; [α] p ⊢ p
Φα ⊢ p < [α] p
1α ⊢ p < [α] p
1α ; [α] p ⊢ p
[α] p ⊢ 1α > p
[α] p ⊢ 1α → p
Φα ⊢ 1α p ⊢ {α} p
1α → p ⊢ Φα > {α} p
reduce′
1α → p ⊢ {α} p
1α → p ⊢ [α] p
〈α〉⊤ ⊣⊢ 1α
Φα ⊢ 1α
I ⊢ 1α < Φα
nec
{α} I ⊢ 1α < Φα
I ⊢
{
α} (1α < Φα)
⊤ ⊢
{
α} (1α < Φα)
{α}⊤ ⊢ 1α < Φα
Φα ; {α}⊤ ⊢ 1α
reduce′
{α}⊤ ⊢ 1α
〈α〉⊤ ⊢ 1α
I ⊢ ⊤
nec
{
α} I ⊢ ⊤
{α}
{
α} I ⊢ 〈α〉⊤
comp
Φα ; I ⊢ 〈α〉⊤
Φα ⊢ 〈α〉⊤
1α ⊢ 〈α〉⊤
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[α]⊥ ⊣⊢ ¬1α
⊥ ⊢ I
nec
⊥ ⊢
{
α} I
[α]⊥ ⊢ {α}
{
α} I
comp
[α]⊥ ⊢ Φα > I
Φα ; [α]⊥ ⊢ I
Φα ; [α]⊥ ⊢ ⊥
Φα ⊢ ⊥ < [α]⊥
1α ⊢ ⊥ < [α]⊥
1α ; [α]⊥ ⊢ ⊥
[α]⊥ ⊢ 1α > ⊥
[α]⊥ ⊢ 1α → ⊥
[α]⊥ ⊢ ¬1α
Φα ⊢ 1α
⊥ ⊢ I
nec
⊥ ⊢ {α}I
{
α} ⊥ ⊢ I
{
α} ⊥ ⊢ ⊥
⊥ ⊢ {α}⊥
1α → ⊥ ⊢ Φα > {α}⊥
¬1α ⊢ Φα > {α}⊥
reduce′
¬1α ⊢ {α}⊥
¬1α ⊢ [α]⊥
〈α〉⊥ ⊣⊢ ⊥
⊥ ⊢ I
nec
⊥ ⊢
{
α} I
{α}⊥ ⊢ I
{α}⊥ ⊢ ⊥
〈α〉⊥ ⊢ ⊥
⊥ ⊢ I
⊥ ⊢ 〈α〉⊥
[α]⊤ ⊣⊢ ⊤
I ⊢ ⊤
[α]⊤ ⊢ ⊤
I ⊢ ⊤
nec
{
α} I ⊢ ⊤
I ⊢ {α}⊤
⊤ ⊢ {α}⊤
⊤ ⊢ [α]⊤
[α](A ∧B) ⊣⊢ [α]A ∧ [α]B
A ⊢ A
A ;B ⊢ A
A ∧ B ⊢ A
[α](A ∧ B) ⊢ {α}A
[α](A ∧ B) ⊢ [α]A
B ⊢ B
A ;B ⊢ B
A ∧ B ⊢ B
[α](A ∧ B) ⊢ {α}B
[α](A ∧ B) ⊢ [α]B
[α](A ∧B) ; [α](A ∧ B) ⊢ [α]A ∧ [α]B
[α](A ∧ B) ⊢ [α]A ∧ [α]B
A ⊢ A
[α]A ⊢ {α}A
{
α} [α]A ⊢ A
B ⊢ B
[α]B ⊢ {α}B
{
α} [α]B ⊢ B
{
α} [α]A ;
{
α} [α]B ⊢ A ∧ B
mon
{
α} ([α]A ; [α]B) ⊢ A ∧ B
[α]A ; [α]B ⊢ {α}(A ∧B)
[α]A ; [α]B ⊢ [α](A ∧ B)
[α]A ∧ [α]B ⊢ [α](A ∧ B)
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〈α〉(A ∧B) ⊣⊢ 〈α〉A ∧ 〈α〉B
A ⊢ A
A ;B ⊢ A
A ∧ B ⊢ A
{α}A ∧ B ⊢ 〈α〉A
〈α〉(A ∧ B) ⊢ 〈α〉A
B ⊢ B
A ;B ⊢ B
A ∧B ⊢ B
{α}A ∧B ⊢ 〈α〉B
〈α〉(A ∧ B) ⊢ 〈α〉B
〈α〉(A ∧ B) ; 〈α〉(A ∧ B) ⊢ 〈α〉A ∧ 〈α〉B
〈α〉(A ∧ B) ⊢ 〈α〉A ∧ 〈α〉B
A ⊢ A
balance
{α}A ⊢ {α}A
{
α} {α}A ⊢ A
B ⊢ B
balance
{α}B ⊢ {α}B
{
α} {α}B ⊢ B
{
α} {α}A ;
{
α} {α}B ⊢ A ∧ B
mon
{
α} ({α}A ; {α}B) ⊢ A ∧ B
{α}
{
α} ({α}A ; {α}B) ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∧ B)
comp
Φα ; ({α}A ; {α}B) ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∧ B)
(Φα ; {α}A) ; {α}B ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∧ B)
Φα ; {α}A ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∧ B) < {α}B
reduce′
{α}A ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∧ B) < {α}B
〈α〉A ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∧ B) < {α}B
〈α〉A ; {α}B ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∧ B)
{α}B ⊢ 〈α〉A > 〈α〉(A ∧ B)
〈α〉B ⊢ 〈α〉A > 〈α〉(A ∧ B)
〈α〉A ; 〈α〉B ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∧ B)
〈α〉A ∧ 〈α〉B ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∧ B)
〈α〉(A ∨B) ⊣⊢ 〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B
A ⊢ A
{α}A ⊢ 〈α〉A
A ⊢
{
α} 〈α〉A
B ⊢ B
{α}B ⊢ 〈α〉B
B ⊢
{
α} 〈α〉B
A ∨ B ⊢
{
α} 〈α〉A ;
{
α} 〈α〉B
A ∨ B ⊢
{
α} (〈α〉A ; 〈α〉B)
{α}A ∨ B ⊢ 〈α〉A ; 〈α〉B
〈α〉(A ∨ B) ⊢ 〈α〉A ; 〈α〉B
〈α〉(A ∨ B) ⊢ 〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B
A ⊢ A
A ⊢ A ;B
A ⊢ A ∨ B
{α}A ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∨ B)
〈α〉A ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∨ B)
B ⊢ B
B ⊢ A ;B
B ⊢ A ∨B
{α}B ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∨ B)
〈α〉B ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∨ B)
〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∨ B) ; 〈α〉(A ∨ B)
〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B ⊢ 〈α〉(A ∨ B)
[α](A ∨B) ⊣⊢ 1α → (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B)
A ⊢ A
{α}A ⊢ 〈α〉A
A ⊢
{
α} 〈α〉A
B ⊢ B
{α}B ⊢ 〈α〉B
B ⊢
{
α} 〈α〉B
A ∨B ⊢
{
α} 〈α〉A ;
{
α} 〈α〉B
A ∨B ⊢
{
α} (〈α〉A ; 〈α〉B)
[α](A ∨B) ⊢ {α}
{
α} (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B)
comp
[α](A ∨B) ⊢ Φα > (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B)
Φα ; [α](A ∨B) ⊢ 〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B
Φα ⊢ 〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B < [α](A ∨ B)
1α ⊢ 〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B < [α](A ∨ B)
1α ; [α](A ∨B) ⊢ 〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B
[α](A ∨B) ⊢ 1α > (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B)
[α](A ∨B) ⊢ 1α → (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B)
Φα ⊢ 1α
A ⊢ A
{α}A ⊢ {α}A
〈α〉A ⊢ {α}A
B ⊢ B
{α}B ⊢ {α}B
〈α〉B ⊢ {α}B
〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B ⊢ {α}A ; {α}B
〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B ⊢ {α}(A ;B)
{
α} (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B) ⊢ A ;B
{
α} (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B) ⊢ A ∨ B
〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B ⊢ {α}(A ∨ B)
1α → (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B) ⊢ Φα > {α}(A ∨ B)
reduce′
1α → (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B) ⊢ {α}(A ∨ B)
1α → (〈α〉A ∨ 〈α〉B) ⊢ [α](A ∨ B)
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〈α〉(A→ B) ⊣⊢ 1α ∧ (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B)
Φα ⊢ 1α
A ⊢ A
{α}A ⊢ {α}A
〈α〉A ⊢ {α}A
{
α} 〈α〉A ⊢ A
B ⊢ B
{α}B ⊢ 〈α〉B
B ⊢
{
α} 〈α〉B
A→ B ⊢
{
α} 〈α〉A >
{
α} 〈α〉B
A→ B ⊢
{
α} (〈α〉A > 〈α〉B)
{α}(A→ B) ⊢ 〈α〉A > 〈α〉B
{α}(A→ B) ⊢ 〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B
Φα ; {α}(A→ B) ⊢ 1α ∧ (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B)
reduce′
{α}(A→ B) ⊢ 1α ∧ (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B)
〈α〉(A→ B) ⊢ 1α ∧ (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B)
A ⊢ A
{α}A ⊢ 〈α〉A
B ⊢ B
{α}B ⊢ {α}B
〈α〉B ⊢ {α}B
〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B ⊢ {α}A > {α}B
〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B ⊢ {α}(A > B)
{
α} (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) ⊢ A > B
{
α} (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) ⊢ A→ B
{α}
{
α} (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) ⊢ 〈α〉(A→ B)
compαL
Φα ; (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) ⊢ 〈α〉(A→ B)
(〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) ; Φα ⊢ 〈α〉(A→ B)
Φα ⊢ (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) > 〈α〉(A→ B)
1α ⊢ (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) > 〈α〉(A→ B)
(〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) ; 1α ⊢ 〈α〉(A→ B)
1α ; (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) ⊢ 〈α〉(A→ B)
1α ∧ (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) ⊢ 〈α〉(A→ B)
[α](A→ B) ⊣⊢ 〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B
A ⊢ A
{α}A ⊢ {α}A
{
α} {α}A ⊢ A
B ⊢ B
{α}B ⊢ 〈α〉B
B ⊢
{
α} 〈α〉B
A→ B ⊢
{
α} {α}A >
{
α} 〈α〉B
A→ B ⊢
{
α} ({α}A > 〈α〉B)
[α](A→ B) ⊢ {α}
{
α} ({α}A > 〈α〉B)
comp
[α](A→ B) ⊢ Φα > ({α}A > 〈α〉B)
Φα ; [α](A→ B) ⊢ {α}A > 〈α〉B
{α}A ; (Φα ; [α](A→ B)) ⊢ 〈α〉B
({α}A ; Φα) ; [α](A→ B) ⊢ 〈α〉B
[α](A→ B) ; ({α}A ; Φα) ⊢ 〈α〉B
{α}A ; Φα ⊢ [α](A→ B) > 〈α〉B
Φα ; {α}A ⊢ [α](A→ B) > 〈α〉B
reduce′
{α}A ⊢ [α](A→ B) > 〈α〉B
〈α〉A ⊢ [α](A→ B) > 〈α〉B
[α](A→ B) ; 〈α〉A ⊢ 〈α〉B
〈α〉A ; [α](A→ B) ⊢ 〈α〉B
[α](A→ B) ⊢ 〈α〉A > 〈α〉B
[α](A→ B) ⊢ 〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B
A ⊢ A
{α}A ⊢ 〈α〉A
B ⊢ B
{α}B ⊢ {α}B
〈α〉B ⊢ {α}B
〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B ⊢ {α}A > {α}B
〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B ⊢ {α}(A > B)
{
α} (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) ⊢ A > B
{
α} (〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B) ⊢ A→ B
〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B ⊢ {α}(A→ B)
〈α〉A→ 〈α〉B ⊢ [α](A→ B)
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For ease of notation, in the following derivations we assume the actions β,
such that αaβ form the set {βi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
〈α〉〈a〉A ⊢ 1α ∧
∨
{〈a〉〈β〉A |αaβ}
Φα ⊢ 1α
A ⊢ A
{β1}A ⊢ 〈β1〉A
{a}{β1}A ⊢ 〈a〉〈β1〉A
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A ⊢ A
{βn}A ⊢ 〈βn〉A
{a}{βn}A ⊢ 〈a〉〈βn〉A
swap-out′
{α}{a}A ⊢ ;
(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
{α}{a}A ⊢
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
Φα ; {α}{a}A ⊢ 1α ∧
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
reduce′
{α}{a}A ⊢ 1α ∧
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
{a}A ⊢
{
α} 1α ∧
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
〈a〉A ⊢
{
α} 1α ∧
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
{α}〈a〉A ⊢ 1α ∧
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
〈α〉〈a〉A ⊢ 1α ∧
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
1α ∧
∨
{〈a〉〈β〉A |αaβ} ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
A ⊢ A
{a}A ⊢ 〈a〉A
{α}{a}A ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
swap-in′
Φα ; {a}{β1}A ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
{a}{β1}A ; Φα ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
Φα ⊢ {a}{β1}A > 〈α〉〈a〉A
1α ⊢ {a}{β1}A > 〈α〉〈a〉A
{a}{β1}A ; 1α ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
1α ; {a}{β1}A ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
{a}{β1}A ⊢ 1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A
{β1}A ⊢ {
a
} (1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A)
〈β1〉A ⊢ {
a
} (1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A)
{a}〈β1〉A ⊢ 1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A
〈a〉〈β1〉A ⊢ 1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A ⊢ A
{a}A ⊢ 〈a〉A
{α}{a}A ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
swap-in′
Φα ; {a}{βn}A ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
{a}{βn}A ; Φα ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
Φα ⊢ {a}{βn}A > 〈α〉〈a〉A
1α ⊢ {a}{βn}A > 〈α〉〈a〉A
{a}{βn}A ; 1α ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
1α ; {a}{βn}A ⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
{a}{βn}A ⊢ 1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A
{βn}A ⊢ {
a
} (1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A)
〈βn〉A ⊢ {
a
} (1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A)
{a}〈βn〉A ⊢ 1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A
〈a〉〈βn〉A ⊢ 1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
⊢ ;
(
1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A
)
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
⊢ 1α > 〈α〉〈a〉A)
1α ;
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
1α ∧
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
⊢ 〈α〉〈a〉A
55
[α]〈a〉A ⊢ Pre(α)→
∨
{〈a〉〈β〉A |αaβ}
A ⊢ A
{β1}A ⊢ 〈β1〉A
{a}{β1}A ⊢ 〈a〉〈β1〉A
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A ⊢ A
{βn}A ⊢ 〈βn〉A
{a}{βn}A ⊢ 〈a〉〈βn〉A
swap-out′
{α}{a}A ⊢ ;
(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
{α}{a}A ⊢
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
{a}A ⊢
{
α}
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
〈a〉A ⊢
{
α}
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
[α]〈a〉A ⊢ {α}
{
α}
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
comp
[α]〈a〉A ⊢ Φα >
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
Φα ; [α]〈a〉A ⊢
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
Φα ⊢
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
< [α]〈a〉A
1α ⊢
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
< [α]〈a〉A
1α ; [α]〈a〉A ⊢
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
[α]〈a〉A ⊢ 1α >
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
[α]〈a〉A ⊢ 1α →
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
Pre(α)→
∨
{〈a〉〈βi〉A |αaβ} ⊢ [α]〈a〉A
Φα ⊢ 1α
A ⊢ A
{a}A ⊢ 〈a〉A
{α}{a}A ⊢ {α}〈a〉A
swap-in′
Φα ; {a}{β1}A ⊢ {α}〈a〉A
{a}{β1}A ⊢ Φα > {α}〈a〉A
reduce′
{a}{β1}A ⊢ {α}〈a〉A
{β1}A ⊢ {
a
} {α}〈a〉A
〈β1〉A ⊢ {
a
} {α}〈a〉A
{a}〈β1〉A ⊢ {α}〈a〉A
〈a〉〈β1〉A ⊢ {α}〈a〉A
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A ⊢ A
{a}A ⊢ 〈a〉A
{α}{a}A ⊢ {α}〈a〉A
swap-in′
Φα ; {a}{βn}A ⊢ {α}〈a〉A
{a}{βn}A ⊢ Φα > {α}〈a〉A
reduce′
{a}{βn}A ⊢ {α}〈a〉A
{βn}A ⊢ {
a
} {α}〈a〉A
〈βn〉A ⊢ {
a
} {α}〈a〉A
{a}〈βn〉A ⊢ {α}〈a〉A
〈a〉〈βn〉A ⊢ {α}〈a〉A
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
⊢ ;
(
{α}〈a〉A
)
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
⊢ {α}〈a〉A
1α →
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
⊢ Φα > {α}〈a〉A
reduce′
1α →
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
⊢ {α}〈a〉A
1α →
∨(
〈a〉〈βi〉A
)
⊢ [α]〈a〉A
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[α][a]A ⊢ Pre(α)→
∧
{[a][β]A |αaβ}
A ⊢ A
[a]A ⊢ {a}A
[α][a]A ⊢ {α}{a}A
swap-in′
[α][a]A ⊢ Φα > {a}{β1}A
Φα ; [α][a]A ⊢ {a}{β1}A
{
a
} Φα ; [α][a]A) ⊢ {β1}A
{
a
} Φα ; [α][a]A) ⊢ [β1]A
Φα ; [α][a]A ⊢ {a}[β1]A
Φα ; [α][a]A ⊢ [a][β1]A
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A ⊢ A
[a]A ⊢ {a}A
[α][a]A ⊢ {α}{a}A
swap-in′
[α][a]A ⊢ Φα > {a}{βn}A
Φα ; [α][a]A ⊢ {a}{βn}A
{
a
} (Φα ; [α][a]A) ⊢ {βn}A
{
a
} (Φα ; [α][a]A) ⊢ [βn]A
Φα ; [α][a]A ⊢ {a}[βn]A
Φα ; [α][a]A ⊢ [a][βn]A
;
(
Φα ; [α][a]A
)
⊢
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
Φα ; [α][a]A ⊢
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
[α][a]A ; Φα ⊢
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
Φα ⊢ [α][a]A >
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
1α ⊢ [α][a]A >
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
[α][a]A ; 1α ⊢
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
1α ; [α][a]A ⊢
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
[α][a]A ⊢ 1α >
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
[α][a]A ⊢ 1α →
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
Pre(α)→
∧
{[a][β]A |αaβ} ⊢ [α][a]A
Φα ⊢ 1α
A ⊢ A
[β1]A ⊢ {β1}A
[a][β1]A ⊢ {a}{β1}A
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A ⊢ A
[βn]A ⊢ {βn}A
[a][βn]A ⊢ {a}{βn}A
swap-out′
;
(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ {α}{a}A
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ {α}{a}A
1α →
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ Φα > {α}{a}A
reduce′
1α →
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ {α}{a}A
{
α} (1α →
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
) ⊢ {a}A
{
α} (1α →
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
) ⊢ [a]A
1α →
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ {α}[a]A
1α →
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ [α][a]A
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〈α〉[a]A ⊢ Pre(α) ∧
∧
{[a][β]A |αaβ}
Φα ⊢ 1α
A ⊢ A
[a]A ⊢ {a}A
balance
{α}[a]A ⊢ {α}{a}A
swap-in′
{α}[a]A ⊢ Φα > {a}{β1}A
Φα ; {α}[a]A ⊢ {a}{β1}A
reduce′
{α}[a]A ⊢ {a}{β1}A
{α}[a]A ⊢ {a}{β1}A
{
a
} {α}[a]A ⊢ {β1}A
{
a
} {α}[a]A ⊢ [β1]A
{α}[a]A ⊢ {a}[β1]A
{α}[a]A ⊢ [a][β1]A
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A ⊢ A
[a]A ⊢ {a}A
balance
{α}[a]A ⊢ {α}{a}A
swap-in′
{α}[a]A ⊢ Φα > {a}{βn}A
Φα ; {α}[a]A ⊢ {a}{βn}A
reduce′
{α}[a]A ⊢ {a}{βn}A
{α}[a]A ⊢ {a}{βn}A
{
a
} {α}[a]A ⊢ {βn}A
{
a
} {α}[a]A ⊢ [βn]A
{α}[a]A ⊢ {a}[βn]A
{α}[a]A ⊢ [a][βn]A
;
(
{α}[a]A
)
⊢
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
{α}[a]A ⊢
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
Φα ; {α}[a]A ⊢ 1α ∧
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
reduce′
{α}[a]A ⊢ 1α ∧
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
〈α〉[a]A ⊢ 1α ∧
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
Pre(α) ∧
∧
{[a][β]A |αaβ} ⊢ 〈α〉[a]A
A ⊢ A
[β1]A ⊢ {β1}A
[a][β1]A ⊢ {a}{β1}A
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
A ⊢ A
[βn]A ⊢ {βn}A
[a][βn]A ⊢ {a}{βn}A
swap-out′
;
(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ {α}{a}A
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ {α}{a}A
{
α}
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ {a}A
{
α}
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ [a]A
{α}
{
α}
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ 〈α〉[a]A
Φα ;
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ 〈α〉[a]A
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
; Φα ⊢ 〈α〉[a]A
Φα ⊢
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
> 〈α〉[a]A
1α ⊢
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
> 〈α〉[a]A
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
; 1α ⊢ 〈α〉[a]A
1α ;
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ 〈α〉[a]A
1α ∧
∧(
[a][βi]A
)
⊢ 〈α〉[a]A
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